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The purpose of this study is to investigate the
housing policies of Hong Kong. Since it is impossible
for us to cover the whole range of topics concerning
housing policies with an intensive discussion on every
aspect, only certain selected topics are especially
emphasized. From the economic point of view, the
housing problem must be interpreted in terms of market
relations. But no economist would argue that a free
market necessarily produces a socially desirable distri¬
bution of a particular good as long as externalities
exist. In the case of housing service, consumption
externalities justify a certain amount of transfer,
in-kind or in-cash.
Since our housing problem is serious enough to
have invited Interventions from government, it is
necessary for the economist to investigate the outcomes
of these policies. With the exception of Cheung's study1
on rent control, so far little work has been done in
analysing housing policies from the economic standpoint.
Steven N. S. Cheung, Roofs or Stars: The Intents
Effects of a Rents Ordinance, Economic Incuirv, XIII
(March, 1975), pp. 1-21.
It is hoped that some contributions can be made by an
analysis of the public housing programc
Public housing in Hong Kong is the major compo¬
nent of the government's housing policies,, Like public
education and medical services, public housing programs
are production subsidies in-kind with explicitly redis-
tributive Intents. Some economists (e.g. Arron and
2
Furstenberg) regarded transfers to the low-income
i
families in the form of specific commodity were necessa¬
rily inefficient in comparison with transfers in-cash.
Their arguments are valid only when donors arc indifferent
to the recipients' spending patterns. Cn the other hand,
3
Oslen showed that if the donors were a particular kind
of paternalistic altruistic individuals, then some form
of transfer in-kind would be superior as there were con¬
sumption externalities. To be more general, Garfinbel
2
Henry J. Arron and George M. von Furstenberg,
The Inefficiency of Transfers In Kind: The Gase of
Housing Assistance, Western Economic Journal, IX (June,
1971), pp. 184-98.
3
Edgar 0. Gslen, A Welfare Economic -.valuation of
Public Hcusing, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Rice
University, 1968).
4
Irwin Garfinbel, is In-kind Redistrinuticn
Efficient? Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXVII
(May, 1973) pp. 320-30.
demonstrated that if tax-payers preferred in-kind to cash
redistributions, some of the former might be efficient®
Along this line of reasoning, we accept the presumption
that there should be certain forms of transfer in-housing®
However, it is not necessary to give every recipient a
particular physical unit with some amounts of production
subsidy® There is always an alternative method of trans¬
fer in form of consumer subsidies®
In either case, the results of housing subsidies
depend on the elasicity of housing supply® A close in¬
vestigation of residential housing market would open up
a set of problems which I must leave for others to
explore® Instead of providing empirical research of
supply relationships, in this text we assume the housing
market is quite comoetitive®
The key analysis of the empirical work of this
thesis is to estimate the distribution of housing servi—
%
ces, subsidies and tenant net benefits in public housing®«
Adopting the methodology developed by DeSalvo, we are
qoina to measure the difference between subsidies and
5
Joseph S® DeSalvo, A Methodology for valuatang
Housing Program, Journal of Regional Science, XI (1571),
po® 17.3-81®
tenant net benefits (the additional cost of in-kind
transfers). To do this, we must first have an overall
review of the historical and environmental backcrcund of
housing situations and policies in Hong Kong. Second,
it is necessary for us to understand the consumer behavi¬
our in housing demand under market prices as a base for
comparison.
The plan of this thesis is as follows. Chapter I
presents the basic theoretical and conceptual elements of
housing service. Taking housing service as a homogenous
commodity, we review the determining factors of demand
for and supply of housing. With respect to the rate of
supply adjustment to the low-income class, the conceptua¬
lized filtering process in housing is used. It is noted
that housing of the poor will be improved more rapidly as
the speed of filtering down in housing is accelerated.
Following the classical theory on perfect competition, we
implicitly assume the market for housing is quite
competitive. The positive and normative theorems on wel¬
fare economics of transfers are discussed in relation to
housing subsidies. Justifications for public spendings
on housing the ooor are expressed in terms of specific
0
kinds of market failure. Along the suggestion of Cslen
Cslen, op. cit., pp. 1-47
market failure results from the fact that housing service
for the low-income families enters either directly or in¬
directly in the preference functions of tax-payers« In
other words, there are consumption externalities on
housing. The reason for government to intervene in the
housing market is therefore not explained in terms of
market imperfection in traditional theory. A brief survey
of foreign experience in rent control suggests that it may
merely cause permanent deficiency in housing. Different
routes of housing subsidies are summarized, and followed
by a brief literature review on methodology in the evalua¬
tion of public housing programs. Since different instru¬
ments in dealing with the housing problem are based on
different perceptions of the elasticities of demand and
supply, polar cases'are presented in the summary of this
chapter for this elaboration.
Chapter II begins with an introduction to land
sales history in Hong Kong. Justifications of public«
ownership of land are affirmed by both normative and posi¬
tive arguments. With a critical examination of the situa¬
tion of Hong Kong's housing problem, it is suggested that
in the past government interventions in housing market
were either temporary measures or connected with land
acquirements. Rent control is regarded as the emergency
6action in dealing tv,ith housing shortage. Si ice by no
our public housing policies are on the road to provide
decent homes for the poor, the approach to evaluate such
operations s mould be different from what i t had been in
the past. To provide better housing to the poor, it is
not necessary to allocate housing subsidies by means of
assignment of physical units. Consumer housinc subsidies
as an alternative always open. The deficiencies of pro-
duction subsidized housing programs are discussed at the
end of this chapter.
From the viewpoint of housing service, rental
expenditure denotes the amount of consumed housing
service. Based on the household expenditure survey con-
ducted by the Census and Statistics Department, Chapter
III examines the housing consumption pattern of consumers
under market prices. Behavioral pattern are derived from
the observation of household choices under different
circumstances. In addition, we are also in ``rested in
economies of scale in space demand for larger families.
A study of variations in occupied area associated with
variations in household particulars is also included.
This chapter lays the groundwork of our task in the
following chapter.
7Ltilizinc the methodology developed by DeSalvo7,
the main feature of this dissertation is to measure the
magnitudes and distributions of housing services, housing
subsidies and tenant net benefits. This is cone in
Chapter IV which begins with the restatement of the
theory of measurement of consumer surplus and followed by
some quantitative estimation. As our econometric model
is based on the Cobb-Douglas utility functions, we impli-
citly assume unitary income and price elasticity. The
former is based on the empirical findings of the preceding
chapter, and the later is supported by studies of other
economists from observations of foreign housing markets'.
In so far as there is lack of sufficient evidence in Hong
Kong against this presumption, it has been retained in our
formulation. L:We apply Oslen's Theorem9 to evaluate the
distributive outcomes of Government Low-Cost Housing
(GLCH). This method can be extented to analyse other
public housing pfograms as well as GLCH.
7 DeSalvo, Op O cit. Do. 173-21-
c See Richard F. Muth, The Demand for Yen-Farm
Housing, in The Demand for Durable Goods, ed. by Arnold
C. Harberaer (Chicago: University of Chicaco press,
p . 72 and Frank de Leeu,u, The Demand for Housing:A
and Statistics LII I (Feb., 1971), pp. 1-10.
Oslen, off. op.cit.,p.56.
Review of Cross-Section Evidence, 11 The Review of Economics
CHAPTER I
BASIC CONCEPTS IN HOUSING ECONOMICS
This chapter provides a summary and review of
certain theoretical aspects of housing economics relevant
to our study Particular emphasis is given to the con¬
cept of housing service, structure and competitiveness of
the housing market, housing problem and instruments of
housing policy
1.1 Housinq Service
The difficulty in obtaining a good measure of
housing stock is not fundamentally different from the
ordinary index number problem. Because of the non-
homogeneous and durable characteristic of dwelling units,
it is inappropriate to use the number of dwellings as an
accurate indicator of the housing stock. When there are
various kinds of- accommodation, the weighting problem
becomes very complicated. Cne way out of mis difficul¬
ty is suggested by Kuth His adoption of market judgement
j
E Hoffmeyer anc K. Kordhorst, Determinants of
Fluctuations in House-Building in Denmark 1880-1940, in
The Economic Problems of Housinq, ed. by Adela -Team Nevitt
(Britain: St Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 95-96.
implicitly implies the existence of a competitive market
so that identical units of housing' command identical
prices. He suggests,
MA particular structure would be selected as
standard, using relative price would give for
each structure the number of units of housing
in standard housing equivalents. The total
number of housing would then be the sum of
number of standard house equivalents.......
.. as a unit of quantity of housing service
is needed, one unit of housing service is
defined as that quantity of service yielded
by one unit of housing stock per unit of time.
The price per unit of housing service, or
rent, is the price paid by consumers for the
flow of services from one standard house per
unit of time.,,2
In such a. way a homogeneous product' housing' is
defined. With this concept, it is possible to compare
the consumed quantity of housing service in different
types of housing by the observation of rental expenditure.
Admittedly the assumption of a hypothetical competitive
housing market and the conception of housing service
represents a simplification of reality. This simplifi-
a
cation on which empirical research is based will cive
some meanincful information. Furthermore, Cslen defends
the concept of housing service by noting,
2
Richard Fv, Muth, The Demand for Ncn-r arm Housing,
in The Demand for Durable Goods, eb. by Arnold C. Karberger
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960), pp. 32-33.
j_n order to view the housinc market as one
in vhich a homogeneous commodity is brought
and sold, an unobservable theoretical entity
called housing service is introduced......
.... This conceotion of housinc is bound to
raise objections. It will be argued that
housing is a complex bundle of technically
independent attributes. However, since
housing service is not observable directly,
it is not possible to argue for or against
this assumption directly. Hence, it is net
possible to test this theory other than by
reference to its implications. The assump¬
tion of a homooeneous oood called housinc
service can only be rejected if theories of
housing market -without this assumption have
-pr pvnl snsfnru nnuror_
Throughout this thesis we shall apply this usefu
1 O Fh rs ry~i v— I_T i t— c
Based on the concept of housing service, Muth
notes the demand for the housing stock is derived fror
the demand for its services. The desired stock demanc
3
Edgar 0. pslen, i1A Competitive Theory of The
Housing Market, American Economic Review, LIX (Sept.,
1969), pp. 612-22. The degree of explanation in social
science has been elaborated by F. A. Hayek. As the
social phenonmenon is the presence of complex factors,
through observations of such complex situations cannot
decide whether our conditional (if then) statement is
true. It will help us to decide whether to accept a
particular theory as an explanation of the facts which
we observe. See F. A. Hayek, Degree of Explanations,
in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Chicagc
ITniversihv Chica.no Pro c c-_ 1Qfi7 1. nr._
will depend upon the long-run equilibrium rent and
4
income. The long-run rn Kuth's sense is that everytmng
is in eauilibrium. The function of the housina market is
to balance consumer demands for housina services and the
quantity produced. This equilibrium condition will
achieve through the price mechanism. Housing service can
be treated as a flow of sheltering service which con¬
sists two elements, quality and space. Regarding diffe¬
rentiation in housing quality Smith says,
As long as there is inequality amongst house¬
holds with respect to their ability and desire
to command housing, there must be qualitative
differentiation of the housing stock.
From this viewpoint, filtering in housing can be explained
in terms of changes in resident's income. Since filtering
is usually an important feature of changes in supply of
housing services, a more detailed discussion is placed in
the next section.
Recently, there are many econometric studies of
demand for housing, which according to classical economic
theory of demand is a function of price and income.
4
Muth, The Demand for Non-Farm Housing, p. 34.
5
Wallace F. Smith, Housing: The Social and Sconcmic
Elements (Berkeley and Los Angels: University of Califorina
Press, 1970), p. 315.
Permanent income rather than declared income is more
interesting to economists in estimating income elastici¬
ties- Estimates based on time-series data are usually
somewhat lower than those based on cross-sec tier data
though these two forms of analysis are not comparable.
With respect to the estimates of cross-section studies of
income elasticities Leeuw summarizes as.
For renter families the adjusted estimates are
0,8 to 1.0 based on Re id' s inter-area ccmoari-a.
sen and 0.85 based on Lee's reinterview study-
For homeowner families, the adjusted
estimates are 1,35 based on Muth's study, 1.35
to 1.46 based on Reid's inter-area comparison,
1.25 based on Winger's study, and C«7 based on
Lee's study.
Results of estimates on time-series data is
summarized by G. Carliner. He notes,
Frank de Leeuw, The Demand for Housing: A Review
of Cross—Section Evidence, The Review of Economics and
Statistics HIT (Feb., 1971), pp. 1-10. The results
refer to: K« G. Reid, Housing and Income (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962). Tone H. Lee,
Housing and Permanent Income: Tests Based on a Three-
Year Reinterview Survey, The Review of Economics and
Statistics I. (Nov., 1968), pp. 480-90. Muth, The Demand
for Non-Farm Housing, pp. 29-96. Alan R. Winger,
Housing and Income, Western Economic Journal VI (June,
1968), pp. 226-32. Lee, Housino and Income, no. 480-
90,
Muth found a stock elasticity of 09, while
Lee found it to be 0„34o However, Houthakker
and Taylor found long-run elasticities of 1.5
for renters and 2.4 for owners.
Both cross-section and time-series studies support
the notion that demand elasticities, especially for
housing are greater out of permanent income than cut of
current income. To the extent that the permanent Income
Hypothesis is accepted, income effects estimated by relat¬
ing current expenditures to current income can be under¬
stated substantially.
When time-series data is used in accrecative
nature, simultaneous error will cause bias in estimation
with least square method-, Unless the regression equation
is reformulated, the estimates with ordinary least square
Geoffrey Carliner, Income Elasticity of Housing
Demand, The Reviev-; of Economics and Statistics LV
(Nov-, 1973) pp- 528-32. The results refer to: Richard
F. Kuth, The Stock Demand Elasticities of Non-Farm
Housing: Comment, The Review of Economics and Statistics
XLVII (Nov., 1965), pp. 447-49. Tong H. Lee, The Stock
Demand Elasticities of Non-Farm Housing, The Review of
Economics and Statistics XLVI (Feb., 1964), pp. 82-89.
H. S. Houthakker and L. D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the
United States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
1970).
For a further study of Permanent Income Hypothesis
see Miltc-n Friedman. The Theory of The Consumption
Function (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957).
method will be inconsistent. This kind of analysis has
generally focused on the derivation of cine-series
relationships: if is exemplified by search for demand
curves, to ascertain how sales fluctuate in resconse to
changes in price and income. But prices and sales are
simultaneously determined by supply and demand in the
market. As Needleman points out,
A fundamental difficulty in trying tc estimate
housing demand relationships is that we do not
have observed values of housing demand, we
only have observed values of sales, and sales
are determined not only by demand factors but
suDDiy factors as well.1™
In order to overcome this difficulty most of rhe
researchers use reduced form technique. For example,
Muth's equation is expressed in excess form.1 On the
other hand, Lee defines his model to be a recursive
system and ordinary least square method is employed.
For a proof of simultaneous error and discussion
on identification problem see J. Johnston, Econometric
Method, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1972), pp. 341-72.
L. Needleman, The Economics of Housing (London:
Staples Press, 1965), p. 51.
Muth, The Demand for Non-Farm Housing,
pp. 35—42.
Lee, The Stock Elasticity of Non-Farm Housing,
pp. 83-84.
As far as permanent income is concernec, the
weighted average value of past and current income is used
1 3
as the independent variable Since in Hong Kong our
time-series data in housing is net long enough to provide
a useful analysis, we adopt cross-section data in our
analysis
There are some points we have to note in cross-
section analysis. Using consumer budget studies to find
the relationships between rent and income, the residual
variance about the regression function very likely in¬
creases with income As this is concerned, in the
following analysis some kind of transformation is per¬
formed. In addition, it is generally noted that declared
income does not represent permanent income'', If
lagged declared income is used as the instrumental vari¬
able, which must be highly correlated with true income,
13
Friedman's per capita expected-income series is
used in Muth's study, see Muth, op. cit., p. A'7.
1 A
Beyond the measuring error due to uncerstatement
of income, there are two reasons providing declared in¬
come do not represent the true concept of income. It
is because (a) declared income in budget studies is
generally measured for very short periods so that it con¬
tains considerable transitory elements which are irre¬
levant for spendinc decisions, and (b) in manv studies
measured income covers only certain types of income, while
other types— such as income from property, income from
interest, etc.— are ignored, see Nissan Liviaton,
Errors In Variables and Engel Curve Analysis, Scono-
metrica, XXIX (July, 1961), p. 340.
the random element between total expenditure and income
15
must show low correlation« This method is suggested by
i 6
Liviaton, and utilized by Lee who used three-year re-
interview data and adopted lagged measured income as
17
instrumental variable. As far as no remterview data
is available to us, this method is not applicable to our
study, in which the household expenditure level is used
as an appropriate proxy for permanent income. A more
detail elaboration on this point is placed in Chapter III.
The large variation in estimates of income elasti¬
city makes the question whether housing is a luxury or a
necessity unsettled- It is thought that the difference is
not only because of the difference in empirical data but
also due to the difference in equation specifications.
Provided that housing may behave as a luxury in one range
of income and as a necessity in a different range, non-
linearities assumption of rent-income relationship will
15
See E« Kalinvaud, Statistical Methocs of Econo¬
metrics (London: North—Holland Publishing Co-, 1966),
p. 351.
16
Nissan Liviaton, Test of the Permanent-Income
Hypothesis Based on a Reinterview Savings Survey, in
Measurement in Economics in memory of Yehuda Grunfeld ed•
by Carl F. Christ and others (Stanford: Stanford TJniver-
sitv Press. 1963). dd. 29-59-
17
Lee, Housing and Income, p„ 480-
18
allow for the research of this possibility, which we
have left for others to explore.
In most of the researches there are limited
attention paid to the separation of 'space demand1 and
'quality demand1. When the concept of housing service
is adopted, 'housing expenditure' becomes the sole de¬
pendent variable in households expenditure studies. The
question whether housing service is a necessity in terms
of its income elasticity smaller than one has no unique
answer. But 'sheltering space' is always regarded as a
necessity. If we are interested in the 'space demand'
then it is necessary for us to 'Separate the expenditure
elasticity into two components as quality elasticity and
19
quantity elasticity. It is not immediately appropriate
18
For further discussion see Robert Ferber,
Research on Household Behaviour, in Surveys of Economic
Theory. 3 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1966), p. 138.
In which he writes, as Schwabe's Law, namely,
that the per cent of income spent for housing declines as
income rises, although using permanent income concepts
Margaret Reid alleges that high-quality housing in reality
is one of the main luxuries of consumers. It refers to
Mo G. Reid, Effect of Income Concept Upon Expenditure
Curves of Farm Families, Nat. Bur. Econ. Research S tudies
in Incomes and. Wealth, XV (New York: 1952), pp. 133-74;
M. G. Reid, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate,
Journal of Political Economy LXVI (April, 1958), Dp. 131-53.
19
Houthakker has noted that the expenditure elasti-
city, in fact, is the sum of the quantity elasticity and
the quality elasticity. See S. J. Prais and H. S. Houthakker,
The Analysis of Family Budgets, 2nd edition (London:
Cambridqe University Press, 1971), p. 112.
to estimate the variations in physical space by observe-
tion of rental expenditure variations To most of the
planners, the housing problem is recognized in both 'low
quality of housing service and 'extremely little shelter—
21
ing space per capita'~ And, if the housing problem is
severe overcrowding, the physical quantity elasticity be¬
comes much more important for planning purpose. In addi¬
tion to this, there are usually 'economy of scale' in
space demand which we are going to deal with in Chapter
III.
1,3 Supply of Housing
To consider any housing policy we should study
the supply of housing There are two ways to change the
supply of housing service. One is to change housing
units by means of residential construction, the other is
20
This is because if the quality elasticity is
greater than zero, the change in expenditure consists
change in quality as well as change in quantity
As Mok notes, Due to the effects of population
changes, changes in house size and number, the accumulated
backlog of housing need, and the depletion of housing
stock, the developing countries are now facing serious
housing problems. Especially critical are the problems
of the large cities, which are overcrowded =s a result
not only of the increasing number of permanent residents
brought about rapid population growth, but also of emigra¬
tion of laroe numbers from rural. See Benjamin ft. Kok.
Population Change and Housing Meeds, in Peculation and
Development Planning ed. by Warreen C. Robinson (Kev: York:
The Population Council, 1975), p. 100.
to change the quality of existing housing units. With the
presumption of a competitive housing market, the supply of
new housing units responses to the demand for housing
throuoh the market mechanism. With a detail knowledge of
the market demand, the supply function can be simply re¬
garded as a function of price and vacancy ratio. The re¬
action to chances in demand depends on the organization
22
and profit expectations of builders and investors.
l
Other determinants, which are no less important, are
2 3
market structure and market information. These are to
be observed in the competitiveness of the housino market.
With respect to the rate of supply adjustment,
it is found to depend upon the short-run and long-run
elasticity of supply function. Muth finds not only that
22
Leo Grebler and Sheman J. Maisel, Determinants of
Residential Construction, in Impacts of Konetarv Policy
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Press, 1963). Reprinted in
Urban Analysis: Readings in Housing and Urban Development
ed. by Alfred N. Page and Warren R. Seyfriec (Illinois:
Scott, Foresman .and Co. Press, 1970), p. 60.
23
The transaction costs and competitiveness of hous¬
ino market depends on the information costs of the market.
—j a.
Vacant apartments which are regarded as buffer inventories
increase the options of buyers. Hoarding costs incurred
by the owners of vacant apartment generally reduce the costs
of search of the home searchers. Armen Alchian points out,
Discovery cf the variety of bids and offers and the best
path or sequence of actual exchange prices toward an
'equilibrium' requires search over the population. See
Armen Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource
Unemployment, Western Economic Journal, VII (June, 1966),
pp. 109-10.
the supply of new housing is highly elastic in the long-
run but also that there is a high degree of mobility of
resources into the residential construction industry even
24
over short period of time. From this we may thinx hous¬
ing units are temporarily expensive for a time as demand
increase, but when sufficient additions have been mace to
the stock, the normal price will be restored. With the
complete adjustment after a time-lag and no continuous
excess demand, in the long-run the housing market is in
equilibrium.
Another aspect concerning the supply of housing
service is quality changes with unvaried numbers of hous¬
ing units. It is the problem of maintenance and filtering
in housing. With the consideration of the quality
changes, the supply of housing service is more elastic
than the supply of housing units.
The re-investment decision for UDkeeoino the hous-
inq unit depends on the revenue and the cost of re-invest¬
ment. If the price of housing service increases then the
revenue of upkeeping a housing unit will increase, accom¬
panied by no change in cost we may expect there will be
more re-investments in upkeeping the existing housing
24
Kuth, Demand for Non-Farm Housing, pp. 42-63.
stock. With adequate upkeeping for housing units more
housing services will be produced. It is another argu¬
ment for elastic housing service supply.
One may raise an objection against a competitive
housing market for the segregation of it. Housing market
is sometimes divided into sub-markets that available to
different income classes. It is based on the assumption
that different types of units supply with different rents,
and different income classes have different abilities and
willingness to afford different types of dwellings. But
such segregation of housing market is arbitrary. We have
to note that there are substitutions between housing sub-
markets. In the course of time substitutions will
increase.
It is found that the age of housing units and the
income of their occupants is usually inversely related.
The relationship is generally conceptualized and connected
with the filtering process in housing supply. It has been
suggested that the quality of the low income class housing-
can be best improved by accelerating the filtering process
2 5
with v:hich housing passes down to the low-income class.
p 5
J. Do Berridge, The Housing Market and Urban
Residential Structure: A Review, Centre for Urban Community
Studies, Research paper no. 51 (Canada: University of
Toronto Press), p. 16.
To define the meaning of filtering Ratcliff writes,
The changing of occupancy as the housing that
is occupied by one income group becomes availa¬
ble to the next lower income group as a result
of decline in market price, i.e. in sale price
or rent value026
An alternative is suggested by Lcwry as,-
the change in the real value,
(price in constant dollars), of the dwelling
unit.27
No matter what is the more useful definition, we
are clear that the rate of filtering is determined by
supply and demand of housing sub-markets. Throughout this
text there is neither empirical investigation in the hous¬
ing supply adjustment nor in filtering process in housing.
However, the considerations of upkeepinc and filtering in
housing enable us to assume the market of housing service
is quite competitive. And, it is undeniable that as far
as housing policies are concerned, these two aspects can
not be ignored.
R.-U. Ratcliff, Urban Land Economics (New York:
KcGraw-Hill Press, 1949), p. 32.
27
Ira S. Lowry, Filtering and Housing Standards:
A Conceptual Analysis, Land Economics XXXVI (1960),
p• 362.
1.4 Hcusino Market
Before we go on with our discussion on the com¬
petitiveness of housing market, it is useful to review
the classical theory on perfect competition, Mrs.
Robinson has shown that physical differentiation is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for market
28
imperfection. There is no point to claim that housing
market is imperfect since there is physical differentia¬
tion of dwelling units. Cnce a homogeneous product,
housing service, is defined and the similarity of buyers
is assumed, one of the necessary conditions of a perfect
29
competition market is fulfiled. There as also no need
to say that housing market is imperfect as the number of
firms does not ensure a condition that an increase of any
one firm should produce a negligible effect upon price.
Robinson has reminded us as follows,
It is impossible to discuss the number of firms
required to ensure perfect competition without
discussina the marginal cost curves of the firms
composing industry.0
2 8
Joan Robinson, What Is Perfect Competition?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics XLIX (Nov., 1934),
DD. 112-13.
29
Furthermore, Robinson notes, The definition of a
commodity is completely arbitrary, and definition of a




In reality there are few markets strictly fulfil-
Una all four conditions of oerfect comoetinion listed by
Henderson and Quandt. The assumption of a perfectly
competitive market in the private housing sector is used
to develop a theory of great explanatory power. Whether
we accept it as a tool to explain the facts which we
observe can only be judged by its predictions and
implications»
A short run housing shortage may be caused by a
change in income, the number of households, and the price
of capital and other inputs. The rental movement and the
adjustment time-lags of supply and demand depends upon
the behaviour of the participants in the housing market.
With different values of the adjustment parameters Leeuw
and Ekanem build a simulation model of the housing market,
These four conditions are: (1) A homogeneous pro¬
duct and similarity of buyers and sellers. (2) Many
buyers and many sellers and each individual unit are
small In relation the aggregate volume of transactions.
(3) Perfect information of buyers and sellers. All indi¬
vidual units is either utility or profit maximizino.
(4) Free entry and exit in market for both buvers and
sellers. See J. II. Henderson and R. E. Quanta, Micro-
economic Theory: A Iiat'nematical Approach 2nd edition,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 1571), p. 104.
32
Mil ton Friedman, ?,The Methodology of Positive
Economics,11 In Essavs in Positive Economics, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 3-21.
and the possible paths cf approach to the long-run outcome
33
have been studied. Subject to the uncertainty of the
34
values of parameters one of the implicate on from their
study is stated as,
An income subsidy to low-income households would
probably drive up rents gradually ever a period
of a few years rather than suddenly at the time
of introduction of the subsidy. This would be
especially true if the subsidy have not heavily
earmarked for housing. 5
It points out that changes in income have a long
term effect on the housing market. Though we have no
observation of the competitiveness in Hone Konc residen-
tial housing market, we assume it is quite comnetitive.
1.5 The Welfare Economics of Housina Problem- - - - - . . . —
If there are significant externalities in consump¬
tion of a particular good, then no economist would argue
that a free market necessarily produces a socially desira¬
ble distribution of it. One principal reason for govern¬
ment intervention in the housing market is the belief that
if left unassisted, many households would purchase less
33
Frande De Leeuw and Nkanta F« Ekanem, Time rags
in the Rental Housing Market, Urban Studies X (1973),
nn. X Q— H P_
34
The values of parameters reflect the response
rates of buying and selling behaviour with respect to the
economic sicnals of housina market.
Ibid., p. 63.
housing service than socially desirable. Such kind of
externality enters into the preference functions of the
tax-payerse It is used to justify the transfer in-kind
by a normative theory. If there is social benefit from
the activity of transfer in-kind then there Is no solution
36
to the housing problem through a free market system.
Based on traditional welfare economics Arrcn and•,
Furstenberg demonstrate the inefficiency of transfer in-
kind by a case study of housing assistance.' They start
with a convex preference function to prove any transfer
in-kind is no better off than an equivalent transfer In-
casho And, then they try to quantify the welfare loss
that imposes on the recipients by transfer in-housing.
But this inefficiency can be treated as a net welfare
loss only when donors are indifferent to recipients'
spending patterns. Cn the other hand, if the donors are
such individuals that their
i h
Richard F. Muth, Slum and Poverty. in The
Economic Problem of Housing ed. by Nevitt, p. 259.
3 7
Henry J. Arron and George M. von Furstenberg,
The Inefficiency of Transfer In Kind: The iase of
Housing Assistance, Western Economic Journal, IX
(June, 1971), pp. 184-98.
... paternalistic altruism involves a
desire for low-income families to consume more
housing service, then we may properly say that
these altruists have a demand for housing
service for low-income families.3S
It is inappropriate to define it as a loss without con¬
sidering the consumetion externality of such in-kind
transfer. It seems better to define it as additional
cost for transfer in-kind. However, it is worthwhile
to quote Garfinbel's comments,
The traditional case against and the more
recent arauments for in-kind redistribution
are special cases, based upon particular
(thouch sometimes implicit) assumptions about
preferences.0
If taxpayers1 utilities are independent of
the arauments in potential beneficiaries'
utility function, in-kind redistributions
are inefficient. If taxpayers
prefer in-kind to cash redistributions, some
of the former may be efficient. But hew much
in-kind redistribution there should be de¬
pends not only on taxpayers' preferences, but
also on beneficiaries1 preferences and the
community's social welfare function. 0
3 8
Edgar 0. Cslen, A Welfare Economic Evaluation
of Public Housing, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation
(Pvice University, 1968), p. 47.
39
Irwin Garfinbel, Is In-kind Redistribution




Oslen assumes the donor derives utility only from
increases in recipient's consumption of a particular good
(e.g. housing), not from increases in recipient's incomeo
In the pre-transfer state the donor is willing to increase
the recipient's consumption of such good at his own
expense With certain assumption Cslen calculates the
optimal amount of subsidy. Kis estimation is based on the
concept of consumer's surplus and the optimal is a local
42
optimal only.
As long as the housing problem exists for any
reason, it implies there is a certain amount of social
benefit from intervention. Granted that government inter¬
vention in housing market is justified by the existence
of externalities, we still have to consider the benefits
and costs of various kinds of intervention of which trans¬
fer in—kind is only one. It is necessary for us to keep
A i
Garfinbel points out that this is a set of highly
restricted assumptions. He sets that if the donor derives
utility from increases in recipient's consumption of a
particular good more than from increases in recipient's
income then it is sufficient to establish that some amount
of in-kind redistribution is efficient. Ibid., pp. 326—27.
42
Cslen, op. cite, pp. 11~20 In his work Cslen
used Sarriuelson' s definition that a oood oeneratinq a con-
sumption externality is a public good. See Paul A.
Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation,'
in Public Economics ed. by J. Kargolis and H Guilton,
(New York; 1969), p. 102.
in mind that different forms of intervention involve
different amounts of social cost and different consequences.
Thus? we are still left with the economic question as what
form of intervention is most appropriate.
1.6 Rent Control
One classical form of intervention in housing
market is rent restriction. As an emergency measure, rent
control is usually introduced when the short-run supply
can not catch ud with demand. It means the short-runX-
market rent would be higher than the long-run equilibrium
rent if there were no government control. The common case
emeroes at the time after a war or a larce influx of
population. But it is the cruel fact that in a competitive
market the existence of price-pegging in rental payment
would only create permanent excess demand since the price
ceiling is effective, resulting in deteroriation and dis¬
couragement of new investment in the housing sector. Rent
•«
restriction as a temporary expedient will merely prolong
the existence of the defficiency in housing. There is no
authomatic mechanism to restore the condition to the long-
run equilibrium. This is generally recognized facts as
Wolman notes,
Despite the benefits tenants derive from rent
control in the form of decreased cost of
housing, it appears that there are very serious
long-term effects of pursuing such a policy
Rent control has contributed to the housing
problem in both New York and the United Kingdom
through preventing adequate maintenance and
discourage new investment,43
Ira S. Lowry reports,
The City's (New York) system of rent control
has achieved its principal objectives, the
protection of tenants from 'unfair' rent
increases in a tight housing market. But by
preventing rents from rising in step with the
cost of supply rental housing, it has left
owners with few alternatives to undermainten-
ance and reduction of building services.
Furthermore, experience tells us that once rent control
is imposed there is little hope for its removal. As
Freidman and Stigler notes,
As long as the shortage created by rent ceiling
remains, there will be a clamour for continued
rent control,45
On the other hand, if rent control is considered
as a means to provide social service as Collingworth
savs,
43
Herlod L. Wolman, Housing and Housing Policy m the
U. So and the U. K. (London: D« C, Health and Company,
1975), p. 46,
44
Ira S, Lowry ed., Rental Housing in New' York City
Vol, 1, Confronting the Crisis (New York: Rank Corp, 1971),
p. 12.
45
Milton Friedman and George Stigler, Roofs and
Ceiling The Current Housing Problem, in Popular Essays
on Current Problems. Vol, 1, No. 2 (New York: Foundation
for Economic Education Inc., 1946), p. 3C.
....... on this view, control should be re¬
garded not as a temporary expedient, but as a
permanent and desirable feature of housing
prvi rp.46
then tenants in controlled housing are permanently receiv¬
ing benefits at the expense of landlords. Without commit¬
ting ourselves to any normative judgement on the distri¬
bution of benefits and costs, it is necessary for us to
point that if the aim is to keep rents permanently
depressed, then for as long as rents are held below market
rates it will be necessary to use public money to provide
total suddIv.
1.7 Housing Production Subsidies and Consumer Housing
Subsidie s
Housing consumption externality and. housing
subsidy have been discussed in the preceding section.
Instead of imoosinc costs to landlords through rent
control, government housing subsidies produce other
alternatives. There are essentially three routes by which
the poor are enabled to have better housing. The first
4 6
J. 3. Collingwcrth, Housing and Local Government
( London: Georae A1 1 pn TTwi n. 1 Qfifi). n. 2 5_
4 7
F. A. Hayek, The Repercussions of Rent Restric¬
tions, originally published in Schriften des Vereins fur
Sozialpolitik, 182, (Munich, 1930); translated into English
and reprinted in Verdict On Rent Control TEA Readings Ho. 7
(England: The Institute of Economics Affairs, 1972), g. 5.
is the existing method in Hong Kong according to which
certain dwelling units are built and allocated to the-
eligible according to a variety of criteria including
family size and income limit. This is usually classified
as housing production subsidy associated with public
housing program. It is a direct form of transfer in-kind
and its deficiencies will be reviewed in the following
chanter.
The second method is transfer in-cash. It Is an
unconditional cash grant given to recipient without inter¬
ference with his free choice. With the discussion In
section 1.4, it is known that transfer in—cash is not
necessarily more efficient than transfer in-kind. The
effects of this method depends upon the recipient's income
elasticity cf housing demand. It is also a question of
how far anc at what cost that the private sector can
mobilize resources into housing industry.
The third alternative, which lies between the
former two, provides families with Income supplements on
the condition that these extra incomes are to- be used
entirely for rents. It Is an indirect form of transfer
in-kind with greater flexibility. Such kinds of consumer
housing subsidy may take the form of rent rebates, rent
reductions, differential rents, or housing allowance
payments. Ignoring the dynamic process of adjustment,
Cslen utilizes an equilibrium condition to provide a posi-
tive theorem of the voluntary voucher scheme. He alo
describes a situation in which vouchers can result in an
optimal resource allocation and shows what values of and
charge for the vouchers must be inorcer to achieve opti-
mality in this situation. The basic rationale for con¬
sumer housing subsidy is that housing allowance is based
on individual family's need rather than a particular
rationing policy. Consumer housing subsidies permit the
recipient to have more flexible choices in accordance with
his preference but are still subject to the constraints
on the supply side. There is no authoritative study as
to what extent landlords can profiteer from the introduc-
tion of housing allowance system. The International
Federation for Housing and Planning Committee on Rent and
Income finds, (housing allowance) represents only a very
48
Edgar 0. Oslen, Subsidized Housing m a Competi-..:
tive Market: Reply, American Economic Review LXI (March,
1971), pp. 220-24.
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To exDlain this point, it is the last: section of
this chapter.
50
E. J. Howenstine, The Changing Roles of Housing
Production Subsidies and Consumer Housing Subsidies: in
European National Housing Policy, Land Economic LI (Feb.,
1975), pp. 90-91.
3 I
small, 'encouragement to the production of dwellings.
and recommends a combinations of the two subsidy systems
(production and consumer subsidies) with the emphasis
varying according to circumstances. The crucial factor
for consideration in choosing the combination is the
supply elasticity of housing.
1.8 The Kacitude and Distribution of Tenants' Benefits
in Public Housing
Before we call for any alternative to allocate
housing subsidies it is necessary for us to compare the
benefits and costs involved in public housing, which is
a kind of oroduction subsidies. To do this we have to
understand the amount of subsidy delivered to che reci¬
pient through an physical public housing unit. One usual
method which is employed by Smolensky to evaluate public
5 2








Committee on Rent and Family Income (Netherlands),
1970 Rent and Family income. The Hague: International
Federation of Housino and Planning, p. 53.
52
Eugene Smolensky, Public Housing or income
Supplements— The Economics of Housing for The Poor,
Journal of The American Institute of Planners« XXXIV
(1968), p«. 95.
where, denotes the stream cf rents minus
maintenance and related expense in
t period cf time..
n denotes the amortisation period of the
building
is the implicit subsidy
And, ail terms in right hand side are discounted
at the appropriate rate cf interest, X
V, in the left hand side denotes the
initial cost of structure.
Solvinc for S., the implicit subsidv equation (11) must
set to be an equality. The main difficulty in utilizing
this approach is the determination of X. If the market
represents optimal resources allocation and. the capital
market is a perfectly competitive market, X must be the
long-term interest rate, which is unstable in the course
of time. One way out of this difficulty is assigning an
arbitrarilv value as the social discount rate. In
addition to the mentioned weakness, another indeterminacy
is the chances of rent and operation costs in the course
of time.
5 3
An alternative is suggested by DeSaivo.
53
Joseph S. DeSaivo, A Methodology for Evaluating
Housing Program, Journal cf Regional Science XI (1971),
pp. 173-81.
Admittedly, in a. competitive housing market, the market
price of a unit of housing service will be equal to the
average total cost in the long-run. The difference
between market rent and actual rent paid by the public
housing tenant represents the magnitude of subsidy, or
we may call it the nominal benefit received by the public
housing tenants. The subsidy is equal to the cost of
transfer only under the condition that public sector
provides housing as efficiently as the private sector,
otherwise its market rate does not represent resource
cost and the subsidy will differ from the cost of transfer.
If the government can only provide a unit of standard
housing service with higher cost, then the market rent of
5 4
public housing is the lower bound of resource cost.'
It is also true to say that the nominal benefit (equivalent
to subsidy) received by the tenant under this situation is
less than the actual cost of transfer.
In measuring the magnitude and distribution of
nominal benefit, Bish assumes the price elasticity of
housing demand is equal to negative one. (A rectangular
54
It is difficult to compare the efficiency of
government and private housebuilding. For the reasons
see Harmish Gary, The Cost of Council Housing, ISA
Research Monographs No. 18 (London: The Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1968), pp. 51-55.
hyperbola compensated demand curve is assumed). In
addition, he further assumes that housing is a constant
55
cost industry. With these two assumptions he is able
to calculate the aggregate estimate of nominal benefit
and its distribution.
It is clear to economists that the nominal benefit
is not equal to the net benefit, as the subsidy in-kind is
5G
not necessarily equal to the equivalent transfer m-cash.
In order to understand the distribution of net benefit and
to estimate the additional costs of in-kind transfer, the
Hicksian price equivalent variation of consumers' surplus
has to be utilized. The concept of Hicksian measure of
benefits has been clearly explained by Murray. He writes,
The Hicksian measure of benefits 'the equivalent
cash grant' is the increase in income which
could, in lieu of a program put an individual on
the same indifference curve as he attains under
the program (i.e. the cash grant which would
make the participant 'as well off' as the
orocram does.
5
Robert L. Bish, public Housing: The Magnitude and
Distribution of Direct Benefits and Effects on Housing
Consumption, Journal of Regional Science IX (1969),
pp. 425-29.
56
Friedman presents a clear statement of distinction
between these two values, though his major concerning is
the difference in direct tax and excise tax. See Milton
Friedman, The Welfare Effects of Taxes, in Essavs in
Positive Economics (Chicaoo: University of Chicaoo Press,
1953), op. 110-13.
57
Michael P. Murray, The Distribution of Tenant
Benefits In Public Housing, Econometrics XLIII, (Juiv,
107P n 770
This important concept is adoptee in Chapter IV
of this text, in which we are going to measure tenant net
benefit. The econometric measurement of this value re¬
quires an ordinal utility function to specify the indivi¬
dual 1s preferences. In order to simplfy the analysis,
a two-commodity (housing and non-housing goods) model is
adopted. Unfortunately, not every utility function Implies
58
an analytical form of cash equivalent. The Cobb-Douglas
5 9
utility function is adopted by DeSaivoU On the other
60
hand, Murray does utilize a CSS function. Both specifi¬
cation s imply a unitary Income elasticity, though the Cobb-
Douglas function also implies price elasticity of unity,
while CES function implies elasticity of substitution to
be constant. One additional distinction is that the Cobb-
Douglas parameters can be estimated on budget shares and
incomes while the qeneralized CES needs observations on
r
prices and quantities. Since the information of
P8
Ibid., p. 773.
Joseph S. DeSalvo, Benefits and Costs of New York
City's Middle—Income Housing Program, Journal of Political
nr-q-.vrv ]yxxIV (August, 1975), pp. 791-804.
60
Murray, _Li• o;;. 771-88.
Idig., p. 776.
households' rental shares and Incomes is provided to us,
62
we adopt the methodology that developed by BeSalvo.
No matter how rigorous that works have been done,
whether the income elasticity equals to one is still
questionable. As we have pointed out in section le2,
this problem is still unsettled., But it is true that
their approaches are meaningful at least tc explain the
outcomes of benefits distribution, which we are most in¬
terested in this study. Unless there is another more
acceptable theory accompanied by reliable data, we still
adopt this approach to investigate the outcomes of Hc-ng
Kong housing policies.
19 Housing Supply Elasticity and Bousing Subsidies
It is found that different instruments in dealing
with housing problem are based on different perceptions
of the housing market. It is more precise to say that the
rationality of different instruments are derived from
different assumptions of the elasticity of housinc suralv
In order tc demonstrate this point, the polar cases are
nresented fnl 1
6?
More detail discussions on the source of data are-
placed in Chapter III.
In Figure 11 housing supply in the private market
is completely inelastic The supply curve is denoted as
S S o Under this assumption any consumer housing subsidy
will shift she demand schedule from D D to 1UEA. As a
result of inelastic supply, increasing demand will only bid
up the price of housing service as from PQ to P9. All
subsidies will go into the pockets of landlords and no
benefit received by the poor in any form. As the supply
























adds Q Q„ amc-unt of housing service. Though rents in the
public housing are charged at market rate, the price of
housing service will decline associated with the.increase
in supply, and rest at P. In this way all the citizens
will be able and willing to consume more housing services
either in cublie or private rental sector.
On the contrary, supply of housing is assumed to
be perfectly elastic as in Figure 1.2. bnder this assump¬
tion public production of housing service will have little
effect on housing demand unless the income of the poor or
















government provides housing service as efficient as private
developers, the market price of public housing is equal to
the long-run average cost.. If there is no subsidy in rents,
4
then government supply of housing can neither change the
relative price of housing nor the income of the poor.
Therefore, it does not change the demand for housing and its
consumed quantity is still at Q. If public supply of
i
housing is accompanied by housing subsidy, rents then become
lower than the long-run average cost. Only under this
situation the demand curve will shift rightward to
from D D, otherwise the objective of public housing to
improve the living conditions of the poor can not be
achieved. On the other hand, consumer housing subsidies
will certainly cause rightward shift of housing demand.
They enable the poor to spend more in housing. Under the
assumption of elastic housing supply there will be suffi¬
cient increase in housing service associated with subsidi-
4
zed consumption.
In the long-run it is inappropriate to say that
housing supply is completely inelastic and it is also
understood that the marginal cost of housing production
may be Increasing. Although none of the polar cases is
realistic, closeness to different polars will give suffi¬
cient guide to produce our mix of housing policies.
According to the second law of supply, the supply becomes
more elastic in the course of time, we may predict that
in the long-run the elastic housing supply is a reasonable
assumption.
f f-i pTro jti u» 1 J_ —i- _L—
ENVIRCNMSNTAL BACKGROUND OF HOUSING SITUATION IN HCMG KONG
The main purpose of this chapter is no provide a
qeneral understanding of the housinc situation in Hone_ — _ • — '
Kong- Much different from chapter I, this chapter is used
mainly to give a historical review rather than a theoreti¬
cal discussion- It begins with land sales history, follow¬
ed by a look at our housing problem, and ends with a review
of major shortcomings of our public housing policies.
2-1 Land Sales History in Hong Kong
Private residential construction is a major way to
increase the supply of housing service. Concerning the
requirement of land in the building industry, it is all
known that land is a crucial factor in housing development.—» j.
«
This section consists of three parts- The first one con-
m
cerns the practice of public ownership of land in Bono Kono,x«-—— J
followed by the second part, which presents some arguments
for public ownership- In the last part of this -section' we
observe the role of land sales revenue in total government
revenue.
2.11 Practice of Public Ownership cf Land
In Hong Kong, land is owned by the Crown arid is
held on lease from the Crown. The Hong Kong Government's
basic policy is to sell land to the highest bidder at
public auctions, and the majority of land available to
general public for commercial, industrial or residential
1
development are sold in this way. The terms cf lease
differ as Roberts writes,
Because of a series of differing opinions of
successive Hong Kong administration in the late
nineteenth century, land was sold on various
differing terms. Some land was sold on lease
for a period of 999 years; some for 99 years,
and some for a period of 75 years. Some leases
were expressed for a further period, whilst
others were not.2
A renewable lease contains a right of renewal
under the condition that the lesee is entitled to a new
lease at such rent as shall be determined by the Director
of Public Works as the fair and reasonable rental value
3
of ground at the date of renewal. Cn the other hand,
a non-renewable lease does not contain, such right, and
1
Hong Kong Government, Annual Report, 1976 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1976), p. 81.
2
Philip J. Roberts, Valuation of Development Land
in Hong Konc (Hona Kona: Hong Kona Universitv Press,
1975), p. 13.
ibid., p. 13.
when the lease comes to an end, the land anc all buildings
erected upon it should revert to the landlord (the Crown,
in the case of leases in Colony). In order to maintain
interest for orivate development on non-renewable lease,
the Government adopted a policy of allowing such leases to
be purchased by private treaty, with premium paid at full
market value of the site. This further lease is usually
in terms of seventy-five years, unless the land is required
A
by the Government for a public purpose.
Public auction is- used to allocate land lease to
the highest bidder; it will make sure that land is used
with highest marginal revenue product. (At least it is
expected to do so during the public auction). One may-
wonder that as the government -is a sole seller of land,
the auction transaction is. not under a condition of perfect
competition. But during the auction when land leases are
sold by bidding and the supply is totally fixed, it is not
correct to say that there is no competition. Because the
supply is perfectly inelastic at that time, it makes no




See Robinson, op. cit., p. 15.
21.2 Arguments for Public Ownership
As we are interested in the justification of public
ownership of land, the normative statement can be most
easily pronounced by quoting the writings of Mill, in
Principles he wrote,
Now this i s ac tually the case with rente The
ordinary progress of a society which increases
in wealth, is at all times tending to augment
the incomes of landlords; to give them both a
greater amount and a greater proportion of the
wealth of the community, independently of any
trouble or outlay incurred by themselves. They
grew richer, as it were in their sheep, without
working, risking, or economizing. What claim
gave they, on the general principle of social
justice, to this accession of riches?
His central theme is a question of equity. Rent may be
treated not as a resource cost but. a transfer payment.
In urban areas, rent is attributed to urban productivity,
and land value is increased by economic progress. It is
thought to be unjust for private landlords to receive such
unearned incomes which are generated by public.effort.
For this reason, public ownership of land becomes an
instrument, for a society to reserve the right that it will
benefit by the natural gift.
Positive arguments for public ownership of land
always refer to externality. The use of land is connected
John Struat Mill, Principles of Political Economy,
ed. by Donald Winch (England: Peguin Book Inc., 1970)
Book V, para 5, p. 169.
with environmental consumption which is a public good in
charactero The common methods of taxation and subsidy for
externalities are not realistic as the durable investment
in land development may be too inflexible in response to
economic signals® In order to have optimal output of
environmental improvement, town planning and public in¬
vestment on physical infrastructure are necessary.
Because of the scale of economy in 'environmental improve¬
ment', it may be more efficient for land utilization when
the land is publicly owned® In Hong Konc, the functions
of town planning and public works investments are carried
by Public Works Department and the Town Planning Beard.
In addition, Land Development Policy Committee is respon¬
sible for town outline planning®
2.1.3 Land Sales Revenue
So far we have discussed the public ownership of
land, and it is interesting for us to observe the trend
in land sales revenue. Table 2.1 shows the irregularity
in the proportion of land sales income to total government
income. A non-parametric statistical test is performed in
the following to see whether these proportions appear in a
random manner® It is a test of randomness by counting runs
above and below the medium®
Table 2.1
Land Sales Revenue and Total Government Revenue
(in HKlMn)
Land Sales Revenue
°L c- Tor? 1
Year
Land Sales
























































































































Source: Hong Kong Government, Annual Reports various years
from 1950-75 (Hong Kong: Government Printer).
Note: Medium value of Land Sales as% of Total Government
Revenue is 5.62. 1 is assigned for these years with
value lower than the medium, and h is assigned for
those years with value higher than the medium.
In Table 2.1 the average proportion is 562% with
standard deviation 4.26%. We assign the ieirer 1 for
those years with value lower than the medium, and the
letter h for those years with higher values- From the
fifth column we observe that the number of letter 1 is,
n= 15; and the number of letter h, is n= 9- The
total number of runs is r= 4.
Knowing the values of n and n, the mean of
number of runs U should be,
and the standard deviation is
With all these values we apply the normal distri¬
bution statistic fo fpcf fho mil 1 hvnnfhpqi of
randomness. The z value of our data is -3.684 and we
reject the null hypothesis at the level of significance
7
1%. We can conclude that the total number of runs is
much smaller than expected and there is a strong indication
7
The theory of this application refers to S. Siegel,
Nonparametrie Statistics for The Behavioral Sciences
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956).
that the higher and lower proportions appear in clusters
or groups. A careful study of Table 2.1 will show that
revenues from land sales play a more important role in
government financial structure after the 50's. Alone the
line adopted by Muth, we assume the changes in building
cost index are indicators for building cycles. In Table
2.2, changes in labour and materials index for building
are used as an indicator of building cycles. Comparing
the values of the third and the fifth column, we discover
that there are cyclical movements in both changes of land
sales revenue and building cost index. If the cost_
indices are good indicators for the level of building
activities, it seems that changes in land sales revenue
lead the changes in levels of building activities. They
are both part of the building cycle.
2.2 An Overall View of The Housing Problem
Hong Kong is a highly industrialized 'city state'.
In Hong Kong the individual is primarily responsible for
his own destiny and the role of the government is essen¬
tially to maintain the stability of the economy and society.
Only limited government interventions are found in the
8
See Muth, Demand for Non-Farm Housing, p. 46.
Table 2.2
Changes in Land Sales Revenue and Changes in Labour Materials





















































































Source: Datas of land sales revenue complied from Hong Kong Government,
Annual Reports various years from 1960-1974 (Eong Kong: Government
Printer).
Col. (d) Data of building costs index is prepared by the Architec¬
tural Office, Public Works Department of Hong Kong. (unpublished
data)
Note: a. The period for land sales is ended at 31st March of next year,
for instance, in i960 land sales is 62.54 SHK Mn. which is gained
from 1st April, i960 to 31st March, 1961. On the other hand the
cost index is annual average in calendar year so that the




business life of the colony. Far from a welfare state
Hong Kong basically is a place where 'crucie capitalism
works'. This point is clearly stated by an official
report that,
Hong Kong is not the full sense, a welfare
state. People are expected to stand en their
own feet, a principle which accords with
their proud and independent spirit.--
It is surprising to discover that the government
started to intervene into the housinq market with the
Rents Ordinance Bill since 1921. The main reason for this
intervention was given as to keep a roof over the heads
of the present occupiers and to protect them, from:
excessive exnloitation.
Before studying the actual consequence of rental
restriction, we must first find the reasons for such
violation of the government's own laissez-faire philosophy.
This is revealed by the following quotation.
Q
Mr. Henry Keswick's comment, in The Times, 23th
August, 1974.
3 0
Hong Kong Government, Annual Report, 1975 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1975), p. 6.
11
Hong Kong legislative Council, Hona rone Hansard-
1921, (Hong Kong: Government, 1921), p. £5.
The simple and only logical reason for the
control of 'domestic premises' by the
prevention of eviction of the tenants and
the standardization of rents must be that
the demand for domestic accommodation so
far exceeds the supply that individual
proprietary rights must be ignored for the
benefit of the community in generate If
nourishment is taken to the first necessity
of life, a roof over the head is the seccndc''
It simply points out that food and housing are
considered necessities. The importance of housing con¬
sumption Is revealed by the fact that average rental
expenditure accounts for 18% of households' declared
3
incomes for all private tenants.Following food, housing
is the second largest item in the bundle of consumption
expenditure. Unlike the supply of food, the production of
housing needs land which cannot be imported. The national
income per capita and the low price of imported food enable
most of the Hong Kong citizens to afford better feeding
than the level of subsistance. But it is not the same
case in housing .consumption. Because of the growth of the
Hong Kong economy with much of her 404 square miles being
mountaineers and unsuitable for development, building land
12
Report of A Committee Appointed cy tne Governor,
in 1951, Rent Control, (Honq Kong: Government Printer,
1953), p. 55.
13
Census and Statistics Department, Report on 1974
Private Housing Survey, Table 25. (Mimeographed).
is scarce, and the development of new site is costly. In
so far as residential land can only be acquired at a high
price and the cost of building is also high, to provide
homes for the poor is generally unprofitable. Then, it
becomes necessary for the government to develop new sites
or encourage private development as a final solution to
land scarcity.
At first, government intervention in the housing
market was only a temporary measure in the pre-war period.
Rent control dated back to 1921, extended in 922 and
14
followed almost by annual amendments. but, massive
interventions emerged as a permanent policy after The
Second World War. The development of public housing pro¬
grams was associated with the squatters problem which
first became serious in 1947 when Hong Kong was still
recoverinc from war damages and a large number of immi-
grants from China flooded into the colony. By the end of
%
1949 the population of Hong Kong had increased from a
figure of 600,000 in 1945 to at least 2 million, of which
15
300,000 were an squatter areas. Squatter fare occured
14
Commassioner of Rating and Valuataon Department,
A Background to Tenure and Rent Restrictions in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1976), p. 1.
15
Commissioner of Resettlement, Departmental Annual
Report, 195556 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1956),
p. 1.
frequently, and every squatter fire became a costly busi¬
ness to the tax-payers, since it resulted in considerable
government expenditure on necessary emergency relief.
The establishment of Resettlement Department in 1954 was
the starting point of public housing program. Squatrers
control, clearance and rehousing projects -were the main
tasks of this new department.
Public housing in Hong Kong is one of the transfer
in-kind activities. The welfare economic implications of4k
such activity has been discussed in section 1.5. It is
only necessary for us to keep in mind that this form of
subsidy is a production subsidy which stresses on physical
units of housing but not on tenants. Table 2.3 shows the
percentage of squatters and metropolitan population de¬
creases since 1964. In this year a working party was set
up to review the policies on squatters control, resettle¬
ment and government low-cost housing. The second ten-year
16
housing program and new housing policies were recommended.
The decline in numbers of squatters indicates that those
policies were at least partly responsible for the
16
Hong Kong Government, Review of Policies for
Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-Cost
Housing, 1964 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964).
Table 2.3



























































Source: a. Commissioner for Resettlement, Departmental Annual Reports
various years: 1954, 3-956, 1959, 1964, 1968 and 1973• The
figures for 1964 and 1968 include squatters in Tsuen Wan, which
have not been counted as part of the metropolitan area.
b. Figures are taken from E. Hambro, The Problem of Chinese
Refugees in Hong Kong (London, 19557 pp. llffT and 142-4;
W.F. Maunder, Hong Kong Urban Rents and Housing (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 1969), p.143; Commissioner for
Census, By-Census 1966 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer),
p.11; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Social
Economic Trends 1964-1974 (Hong Kong: Government Printer) p.3.
The metropolitan population is estimated at 80 of the total
population.
c. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Social Economic
Trends 1964-1974 p.15.
d. Unpublished data provided by the Housing Authority. According to
the squatters survey conducted by the Housing Authority in June
of 1976, there were 98,607 units of temporary structures in
squatters area with 6l,628 families and 274,427 persons at 30th
June, 1976.
17
improvement of the general housing situation.
Squatters control is basically aimed at containing
the growth of squatting by preventing the erection of new
13
squatter structure. Instead of being a welfare opera¬
tion, it is used to enforce the Crown Land Ordinance in
prohibiting illegal occupation of land. The government
feared that without control the growth of squatter areas
might occupy more and more land and it would be difficult
to maintain the infrastructure, and public ownership of
land would be impaired.
In addition to the influx of population, squatter
growth was also associated with high rent and bad condi-
19
tions in the private rental sector. It was found that
In 195657 the average living space per person in private
tenements was 34 square feet, but 35% of households had
20
less than 15 square feet of living space per capita.
17
It can also be explained by the economic progress
which benefits all sectors of the society. As the level of
income increases more people are able to afford better
housing than to be squatters.
18
Housing Authority, Departmental Annual Report,
1975 (Hone Kona: 1975), p. 17.
19
This point of view is also supported by Drakakis-
Smith. See D. W. Drakakis-Smith, Housina Provision in
Metropolitan Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong
Press, 1973), p. 25.
20
Keith Hopkins, Public and Private Housing in Hong
Kong, in The City as a Centre of Change in Asia, ed. by
D. J. Dwyer (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1972),
p. 201.
Even in 1971, the Census and Statistics Department repented
that the effective floor densities were 30 and 68 square
feet per person for tenements and apartment flats respec¬
tively. Thus, the degree of over-crowding in privare
tenements was roughly the same as in public housing.
In 1974,
59% of all households were shared, and among 41%
of unshared households about 31% of them were
overcrowded. It follows that a total of 71.7%
(i.e. 59%+ 41% x 0.31) of all households -were
)
in shared andor overcrowded conditions.
Although the overall average was
64 sc. ft.person, 31% of all households were
housed at below 35 sq. ft.person, 16% at
between 34-49 sq. ft.person, another 18% at
between 50-69 sq. ft.person.23
Thus, it has to be admitted that, even in the rr.id-197C f s,
the housinq Droblem remains severe.A.
To consider the rental costs in the private rental
sector, Dwyer estimated that in 1968 HK$2GC per month was
the minimum rent at which private developers could build
24
residential units in Hong Kong. Table 2.4 snows that in
21
Census and Statistics Department, -one Konc Kcnthlv
Digest, Jan., 1973 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973),
p. 66.
22
Census and Statistics Department, .report or. 19 74
Private Housing Survey, d. 14 (Mimeographed).
Ibid., p. 18.
24
D. J. Dvjver, Problems of Urbanization: The Example
of Hong Kong, Institute cf British Geographers, special
publication no. 1, Land Use and Resources: Studies in
Applied Geography, (1968), pp. 169-85.
Table 2.4
Estimates of Monthly Household Income Required to Rent
A Small Self-Contained Domestic Floor, and Percentage








15% SHK 1860 87.1
2 0% SHK 1395 1G Q
9 c;o'£.Z) c SHK 1116 70.3
Source: a. Based on The Table of Disparity of Household
Income, January, 1971, Census and Statistics
Department, Hong Kong Population and Housing
Census, 1971 Main Report (Hong Kong: Govern¬
ment Printer. 1972) n. 170.
Note: Reported by the Housing Board that the average
monthly rent of a small self-contained
domestic floor, having a covered area of about
360 sq. ft. and a living area 240 sg. ft. was
SHK 279 in 1971. Housing.Board, Report of The
Housing Board, 1972 (Hong Kong: Government
• Printer. 1972) r. 5.
It is reported that in 1974 rental expenditure
accounts for-18% of households' declared
incomes for all private housing tenants.
See footnote 13.
1971 there were less than 30% of households which could
afford a small self-contained flat with 240 square feet
of living area at a monthly rent of HKS279. Hopkins even
claims that the worst living conditions had been hidden
behind the conventional facade of acceptable housing«
He writes,
It is in private tenements that overcrowding
has been unbearable and from private tenements
that squatters have emerged. Squatting is
mostly a symptom of conditions in the private
sector. 25
Since squatting is only a component in our housing
problem, it is connected with rental costs and conditions
in the private housing sector. There will be no final
solution to the squatter problem unless there is no
housing shortage. As we have discussed in section 1.5, if
there is a housing problem in terms of tax-pavers'
preferences, then it provides a condition for increasing
2 6
housing consumption by public actions.
25
Keith Hopkins, Housing the Poor, an Hone Kong-
The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1975). p. 294.
2 6
It is noted that the government transfer activi¬
ties are collective consumption by tax-payers, as we
assume all tax-payers enjoy the utility gained by better
housing for the poor. See Oslen, A Welfare Economic of
Public Housing, pp. 10-15.
The main purpose of this study is to observe the
outcomes of such nubile actions in different forms ofX
government intervention. A closed quantitative investi¬
gation of government low-cost housing is placed in
chapter IV. The following sections of this chapter pro¬
vide a general qualitative survey of the instruments of
housing policies in Hong Kong.
2.3 Rent Control as an Instrument of Housing Policy:
A Historical Review
Rent restriction as we have mentioned Is an
ancient instrument adopted by the government. It emerged
when there was a shortage of housing. A more detailed
discussion on the intents and consequences cf rent con¬
trol in Hong Kong can be found in Cheung's article and
27
his forthcoming book. In this section we only cave a
brief review of the historical development.
•There are two kinds of Rent Control Ordinances
«
which apply differently to pre-war built premises and
post-war built premises. To pre-war premises, as the
result of their nominal rents are fixed at historical
27
See Steven N. S. Cheung, ''Roofs or Stars: The
Intents and Actual Effects of a Rent Ordinance, Economic
Inquiry, XIII (March, 1975), pp. 1-21. His forthcoming
book is announced to cover various asDects of rent con-X
trols in Kong Kong during the period 1921-72.
28
level as standard rent, most of these dwellings
deteriorate quickly. Cne of the major reasons for the
poor conditions in pre-war premises is that their land¬
lords do not have sufficient incomes to adequately main-
tain their oronerties„ It is known that because of the
rent restriction on these premises, landlords find it
unprofitable to reinvest in such controlled properties.
Table 25 shows only a very small proportion (less thanl•
1%) of these buildings were generally fully up to the
standard to meet post-war planning, structure, safety,
condition and health requirement. However, when those
premises which could be brought to such standard with
minimal repairs are Included, the percentage increases
3
to 14.5%. x These facts impress us that if their rents
2 o
Because of the Ordinance of 1947, the rents of
pre-war premises were limited generally by reference to
rent as at December 1941, known as standard rent, plus
certain permitted increases. As the result of rent
control on such buildings after the Second World W7ar,
the average estimated fair market rent of pre-war tene¬
ments is approximately 5 times of the actual rent paid.
See Commissioner of Rating and Valuation Department,




Do Wo Drakakis-Smith, urban Renewal m an Asian
Context: A Case Study in Hona Kona, Urban Studies XIII
(1976), p. 299.
3!
Commissioner of Ratine and Valuation Department,
op. cit., p• 5 e
Table 2-5
Pre-War Tenement Buildings: Number and
Conditions of Buildings
Condition Code
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 Total
Number 42 39 638 870 200 1762 1122 4673
Percentage 0-9 083 13.65 18.62 4.28 37.71 24.01 100
Source: Commissioner of Eating and Valuation Department, A Background
To Tenure and Rent Eestriction in Hong Kong, (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, 1976), Table 2, p. 20.
Note: Condition Codes:
1. Premises generally up to standard in respect to pre-war
premises to meet post-war planning, structure, safety,
condition and health requirements.
2. Except for planning requirements, premises generally up
to standard for structure, safety, condition and health
requirement,
3. Premises could generally be brought up to standard with
fairly minimal repairs and alterations were undertaken.
4. As for code 3; but would not meet planning reauirements.
5. Premises could generally be brought up to standard if
maior repairs and alterations were undertaken.
6. As for code 5; but would not meet planning requirements.
7. Premises in very poor condition and nothing less than
rebuilding would bring them up to standard.
were not frozen at the historical level (or land-lords
would receive compensation in maintenance), the conditions
of some of pre-war tenements would be upgraded. If this
occurs, the stock of housing service provided by pre-war
premises would increase. To what extent that such actions
(removal of rent controlcomoensation in maintenance) can
-u
increase their housing service supply depends on two
factors. The first one is the landlords' incentive in
reinvesting on their properties associated with these
actions. The second is the cost of reinvestment needed to
upgrade the deteriorated premises. The larger of the
first, and the less of the second imply a more elastic
of housing service supply.
To post—war premises, rent control Ordinances were
enacted as a temporary or emergency measure. Rent
Increases (Domestic Premises) Control Ordinance 1963 was
the first piece of comprehensive legislation affecting
the relationship of landlords and tenants of post-war
premises. Its objective was to restrict increases of rent
3 2
to 10% every two vears. It must be noted that new built
premises were entitled to exempt from such restriction.
This Ordinance was the inception of Hong Kong's particular
32
Ibid., p. 11.
style of control: rent increase control. However, it was
allowed to expire on 30th June, 1966 as there was evidence
indicating that in that year quoted rents for new premises
were, in many instances, below the level of increased
33
rents permitted for similar controlled premises.
The 1970 Rent Control Ordinance was enacted to
allow a 15% increases in rent over two years. And, on
15th December 1973 a new legislation was enacted to allow
increases in rent which, other than by agreement, may not
34
exceed 21% (i,e. 10% per annum) of the current rent.'
The most distinguished feature of Hong Kong's post-war
rent legislation has been to allow flexibility and permit
landlords and tenants to agree themselves on rents wherever
35
possible. This approach is different from rent control
in many other areas of the world.
2,4 Review of Public Housing Policies
Before we go on with the review of our public
housing policies we must make clear the difference between
squatter areas and slums. The definition of squatters




rests on the illegality of occupation of land, house or
both. Slums may be defined as legal dwellings which
have been made sub-standard (an impossible definition
to establish on an international scale) by deterioration
3 7
or sub-division,, In clearing land of squatters, the
Housing Department acts on behalf of other government
departments which requires the land for public projects,
land :sales and associated purpose, as well as to lease
land for public housing development. Land requirement
for public housing program receives the first priority in
land clearance« So far land clearances undertaken for
different purposes vary annually in both relative and
3 S
absolute quantities, it is unlikely to discover any
systematic development., When land is cleared, its occu¬
pants may be entitled to rehousing if they satify Housing
39
Department's criteria for eligibility• Rehousing can
be regarded as transfer in-housing to the former squatters,
who resided on 'the cleared land® To all public housing
Drakakis—Smith. Urban Renewal, p. 297.
Ibid.„ d. 297.
3 o
Commissioner of Resettlement, Departmental Annual
Reports various years, from 1954-1972; and Housing
Authority, Departmental Annual Reports various years, from
1972-75. (Honq Kong: Government Printer).
39
Housing Authority, Departmental Annual Report,
1974-1975 (Hong Kong: 1975), p. 19.
tenants, rent is much lower than the market rent.
Therefore the relative price of housing service to other
commodities is lowered.
The economic reason for slum clearance is connec¬
ted with land development and urban renewal. In a com¬
petitive housing market, the existence of slum will con¬
tinue as long as the production of sub-standard housing
is profitable. Because of the fragmentary ownership of
these sub-standard housing, a large scale public project
may reduce the cost of decision and transaction for
redevelopment. By the publication of the report on slum
c earance, one relatively small area (Sai Ying Pun and
Sheuna Wan) of Hone Kona island was isolated and identi-
ag
fied as worthy of renewal. Oslen argued that if the
market for housing service was perfectly competitive,
then slum clearance and urban renewal did not result in
a net deduction in the occupancy of the slums in the long-
%
run, since there was no change in the relative price of
housing or incomes of former residents of the cleared
41
areas. If the purpose of slum clearance is to reduce
40
Hong Kong Government, Report of the Working Party
of Slum Clearance-1965 (Hong Konq: Government Printer,
1965).
41
Oslen, A Competitive Theory of Housing Market'
pp. 18-19.
the social cost of under-consumotion in housing, its
success depends on either increasing the peer's incomes
or reducing the relative prices of housing service to them.
It is necessarv for the Government to rehouse those former
residents in slums to other homes with subsidies.
Presently, in Hong Kong this action is carried out with
public housing programs in lowering the relative price of
housing service to their tenants by government subsidies.
At the beginning, Hong Kong's public housing was
mainly for the purpose of resettling the squatters on land
which was cleared and acquired by the government. However,
our housing policies have gone through a period of trans¬
formation. Mere efforts are made to improve the living
conditions of the lower-income class. The government's
target is to ensure that every family has a permanent,
self-contained flat at a price it can affora. As this
thesis is concerned with past experience, prospective
questions concerning the future are placed in the last
chapter of the text. Table 2.6 gives us a summary of
types of public housing and Table 2.7 shows the priority
list of public housing allocations. This information will
A 2
Hong Kong Government, Annual Report, 1977 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1977), pp. 90-91.
Tio'M~ O g
Types of Public Housing in Hong Kong in 1973
Tvnc• Resettlement
Income limit for admission: No limit
Purpose: Resettlement of families displaced from drown land required for
development; families made homeless by the demolition of dangerous
building, compassionate welfare cases, and certain victims of
natural disasters.
Standards: Mark I and II blocks-communal lavatories and washing places.
Mark II blocks-individual water supplies, private balcony,
lavatories shared by two families, Mark IV V blocks-individual
lavatories, water supplies, private balcony. Mark I-V blocks:
originally allocated at 29 sq. ft. for each adult. Mark VI
blocks: 35 sa. ft.
Rents: $18-35
Type: Government T.ow—Cost Hmisin? (GT.GU
Income limit for admission: Assessed family income below $500 per month
Purpose: Housing for low income families living in overcrowded and sub-
q n rl 7 H AGhnmndpH rm
Standards: 35 sq. ft. for each adult. Cooking bench and water tap on
private balcony, individual lavatories (except in oldest blocks).
Rents: 390-60
Type: Housing Authority Estates
Income limit for admission: Assessed family income between $900 and
3900 p.m. (up to 31250 for high rent units).
Purpose: Housing for families of moderate means living in 'overcrowded
Riih.=: h ri da t H prrnmrnnHfltT on.
Standards: Self-contained units, 35 sq. ft. for each adult plus kitchen,
bathroom and private balcony.
Rents: 360-12C
Type: Housing Society Estates
Income limit for admission: Assessed family income up to 31000 p.m. (up to
$1250 for units of high rents).
Purpose: Housing on economic basis for persons of small income.
Standards: Varies, but generally as Housing Authority Estates
Rents: •S L 2_ i i r
M.S. All rental charges are for a five-persons family.
in 1973 HK$100=US320=£8.20
Source: Reproduced from Table 2 of Drakakis-Smith's article. Drakskis-
Smith, Urban Renewal, p. 302.
Table 2.7
Resettlement Priority List in 1971
(1) Victims of fires and natural disasters, subject to availability of
accommodation.
(2) All other cases recommended for compassionate resettlement by the
Director of Social Welfare.
(3) Occupants of squatter huts declared to be dangerous.
(4) Former domestic tenants of buildings demolished as dangerous and occupants
of surveyed structures on the roofs of such buildings in the side and
rear-lanes.
(3) Present occupants of cottage, licensed or resite areas or occupants of
tolerated structures on Crown land required for development.
(6) Occupants of certain selected souatter areas.
(7) Re-use of licensed areas.
(8) Tenants of overcrowded Resettlement rooms.
(9) Pavement dwellers occupying tolerated structures.
Source: Housing Board, Report of The Housing Board, 1972 (Kong Kong:
Government Printer, 1972) p. 7.
enable us to understand more about the government policies
in the past.
2.5 Major Deficiencies of Hong Kong's Public Housing
Programs
The major shortcomings of our public housing
policies are not different from programs in foreign
43
countries. First, the transfer in-housing imposes
additional cost so that the costs of subsidy are necessa-
rilv Greater than tenant net benefits. The theoretical
viewpoint concerning this has been reviewed in section
1.5, and it will be verified by our empirical study in
Chapter IV.
Second, once occupancy of a public housing unit
is assigned to a family, the family tends to remain there
even from generation to generation unless it
chooses to move. There is no income- limits for the public
44
housing tenants to quit their dwellings compulsorily.
43
The deficiencies of public housing programs in
European Countries see Howenstine, op. cit., pn. 86-94.
44
Hong Kong's policy is similar with the United
Kingdom and different from the United States. In United
States most residents must leave public housing if their
incomes rise to exceed the maximum limit for admission
by more than 25%, see Wolman, op. cit., p. 33.
Consequently, in the course of time some of these house¬
holds have incomes far beyond the limits- of eligibility
for admission. This lack of income limits results in
great diversity in public housing tenants' incomes.
In other words, the government is not giving more assis¬
tances to those families who are most needy. Physically
and financially, the government is unable overnight to
build public housing in sufficient quantities to meet the
requirements of all lower-income families. The long
waiting list of applications reveals an applicant would
45
have to wait for a very long time (from three to five
years). If the relative ratios of applications for
public assistance is a good indicator for those families
who need the help from society, Table 2.8 shows that the
tenants in Group A Estates are not worse off than resi¬
dents in other types of housing. It may be critized
that the government's low-income housing programs
«
(including Low-Cost Housing, Housing Authority and Housing
Society Estates) are providing subsidies which do net go
to those families who need them most but rather to onlv a
-X
portion of low-income families, who in the course of time
45
Dated to 1975 the number of application (applicant
households) is over 300,000 register since 1967. Housing
Authority, Departmental Annual Report, 1975-1976 (Hong
Kong, 1976), p. 32.
Table ZA
Percentage of Recipient Households for Application



























20.91 9.72 53.10 14.09 1.21 0.97 100.00
Ratio of (a)(b) 1.64 0.38 0.52 1.76 0.46 9.41 1.00
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, July 1974 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974), p. 51.
Note: Including those in homes for the aged.
a After 1st April, 19731 Government Low-Cost Housing Estates and
Estates of former Housing Authority are grouped as Group A Estates
in the new establishment of Housing Authority.
4
become a kind of orivileaed sector.
Third, the immobility and lack of adjustment are
common for public housing tenants. They cannot generally
take their subsidies with them if they move (unless they
can arranae an exchanoe with another tenant). We can ask
a question such as: would they move if the government
pays them the subsidy to live in any other unit they
choose? In Hong Kong, we have no information to answer
this question. The findings of Council Housing in United
Kingdom shows that many of public housing tenants would
move to other homes if their housing subsidies were
transferable,
Finally, because of the administration difficul¬
ties once a particular unit is assigned to a household it
is difficult to make the family to move to a smaller flat
48
due to under—occupation• It becomes a common feature
that a great divergence has developed between family size
AC
Similar statement appeared in Howenstine, od. cit.,
p, 88.
47
Hamish Gary and F. G. Pennance, Choice in Housing,
ISA Research Report (London: The Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1968).
48
The meaning of under-occupation is follows: when
a household is elidible for oublic housing a particular—- x— L
physical unit is assigned to it. The allocation of space
is at the rate of 35 square feet for each adult. If more
than two residents have moved out from the assigned flat,
then it will be regarded as under-occupied and this
f ami 1 1 1 1 h ire m rwrzz+- m crnn 1 lor -r 1+-
and flat size in public housing., In the private sector,
as children grow up and leave home, parents usually move
to a smaller accommodation. In public housing, instead
of moving tc smaller quarters and leaving larger flats to
ether families (e.g. young couples with children), some
older couples with smaller family size tend tc retain
their housing for the continuation of enjoying greater
amount of housing subsidy. As rents paid in the pu Jul ic
housing are not reflecting the opportunity cost to..
society, it leads every household to try tc cheat for a
49
larger apartment and remain there.
In summary, much of the deficiencies of our public
housing policies are associated with production subsidies
which stresses on physical unit rather than tenants. In
the course of time, the divergence between the subsidies
that tied to assigned flats and the needs of tenant
households becomes more serious. In addition, the
«
inflexibilities and maladjustment emerge as major short¬
comings in the prevailing policies. In Chapter IV we
measure the additional cost of transfer in-kind by means
of our Government Low-Cost Housing Program, it will give
9
Witn author's working experience at the Housing
Authoritv, it is found that such cases are very common.
us a reference figure for policy decisions. And, it is
noted that consumer housing subsidy which is distributed
according to individual household's need is more flxible.
As we have mentioned in section 1.9, if housing supply
is elastic, the long-run solution of housing problem lies
in demand subsidies rather than production subsidies.
CHAPTER III
HOUSING CONSUMPTION IN PRIVATE RENTAL SECTOR
3.1 Purpose of This Chapter
The main task of this chapter is to study the
consumption of housing in the private rental sector.
It is an independent chapter, but at the same time it
provides the groundwork for the succeeding chapter, in
which we shall estimate the distribution of tenant net
benefits in Government Low—Cost Housing. To do this,
an ordinary utility function has to be adopted in speci¬
fying the household's choices between housing and non-
housing goods under market prices. Since we adopt the
methodology developed by DeSalvo, the Cobb-feouglas
utility function is used. This application implicitly
assumes there are unitary income and price elasticities
of housing demand. In this chapter, we provide evidence
to support that the income elasticity is net significant¬
ly different from I by our empirical findings. This is
the basic Ground for studvinc tenant net benefits. With
respect to an unitary price elasticity, even though we
1
DeSalvo, A Methodology for Evaluating Housing
Programs, pp. 173-83.
have no empirical evidence to support this, there is also
no evidence against this presumption in Hong Kong. Like
other housing economists, it is simply assumed in our
2
formulation an the following chapter.
Another major connection between this chapter and
the next is the study of rent-expenditure ratio of house¬
holds under market prices. The rental share in household2.
budget is necessary in the estimation of tenant net bene¬
fit by the Cobb-Douglas utility function. A more detailed
discussion on this point is placed in Chapter IV. Instead
of giving a theoretical review of the importance of rent-
expenditure ratio in estimating tenant net benefits, this
chapter provides a regression equation in predicting this
ratio.
In addition to these, in this chapter there are
two supplementary findings concerning variations in hous¬
ing consumption with respect to different family size.
One is connected with the homogeneity hypothesis of hous¬
ing service consumption, and the other is connected with
scale economy of housing space demand in larger
families. The former finding is also a supporting argu¬
ment for an unitary income elasticity. This will be
Muth, The Demand for Non-Farm Housing, p. 72;
and Leeuw, The Demand for Housing, pp. 1-10.
verified in the later part of this chapter. And, the
later finding is utilized as a guideline in suggesting
the allocation of space in public housing according to
family size.
This chapter will give a detailed discussion on
the rationality of entering various independent variable
into a regression equation concerning housing consumption.
They .also apply in the following chapter, in which we
shall have more discussion on the dependent variables.
3.2 Basic Assumptions of Family Budget Studies
Even though a household usually contains more than
one individual, it is a unit of decision as far as the
economics of consumption is concerned. Instead of discus-
sing the preference function of an individ ufii wg ciir0 more
interested in the household's preference. Here, we must
remind the readers that throughout this text what we call
tenant is exactly equivalent to the meaning of tenant
household.
In an analysis of family-budget data, a functional
form is sought to describe households' behaviour. It Is
based on an assumption that by observing households in
different circumstances at the same time, relevant informa¬
tion may be obtained for predicting the behaviour of a
particular household when its circumstances are given•
As our expenditure analysis is a cross-section study of
individual households with the assumption of homogeneity
in tastes, we assume that all households under given
circumstances have utilitv functions in which oara-mX.—
meters are constant. As the ordinary least square method
is employed this unattractive assumption has to be
retained. The different circumstances in which house¬
holds are observed in this study are different income and
expenditure, different household size and different
characteristics of the heads of households.
Consider a single household. Classical consumption
theory assumes that, as its preferences for various sets
of goods are given and its total expenditure is equal to
income, the purchase of a particular good is a function of
relative prices and household income. As prices and income
are expressed in infinitesimal terms accompanied by the
continuity of preference function, a continuous demand
curve of a particular good can be derived. The utility
3
A more general assumption is that we assume the
parameters ere random variables with finite mean and
variance. Tith such assumptions Swamy offers an attractive
estimation technique, but his method requires panel data,
which we do net have. See P. Swamy, Efficient Inference
in a Random Coefficient Regression Model, Econometrics,
XXXVIII (1970), pp. 331—231
function of the r-th household mav be written as,
where to x are the amounts of n commodities
ijr nr
consumed bv the r-th household; t„ t, are the5 ir Kir
values of the taste factors t....„ t for the r-th family
(for instance, the family size, the age and sex of house-
hold head), and e is a random variable. The functional
form of U does not depend on r, since the homogeneity of
tastes is assumed. Its implication is that besides the k
factors of tastes the variation in utility with same
income can be explained by the random element. The r-th
household maximizes its utility subject to the budget
constraint as follows,
•(3.2)
where, pn are the prices of n commodities
and m is the budaet of the r—th household. By this
r
formulation we obtain the demand of x, the i-th
commodity demanded by r-th household. In our case, the
i-th commodity is housing service. It follows,
.(3.3)
If there Is no price discrimination across house¬
holds, then p's In (3.3) can be eliminated in a cross-
section analysis. And, because of the parameters of U are
independent of r, It means that given the circumstances
of a household we can predict its quantity demanded on
the i—th commodity by a regression equation which is
derived by cross-section data.
Finally, we have to mention the importance of
non-negativity, that is, the impossibility, in general,
of buying negative quantities of good. Cn the indifferen¬
ce diagrams one is not likely to draw negative quantities.






3.3 The Nature and Source of Data
The data with which we estimate the elasticities
are drawn from the household expenditure survey of 1973-
1974. This survey was conducted by the census and Stati¬
stics Department from July 1973 to June 1974 inclusive.'
The main purpose of this survey was to obtain information
about the expenditure of certain defined households in
4
Paris and Houthakker, op. cit., p. 15.
The General considerations of this survev must beu.
referred to the main report. Census and Statistics Depart¬
ment, The Household Expenditure Survey 1973-74 and The
Consumer Price Indexes (Hong Kong, Government Printer,
1975), pp. 4-5.
Hong Kong to determine a weighting system for a new Con¬
sumer Price Index® The recorded data provide seme basic
information on the socio-economic characteristics of
these households and their rental expenditure in addition
to the sheltering area they occupied® The unit of
enquiry used in the survey was the household which was
defined as a group of persons, whether or not related,
who shared the same shelter and made common provision for
food and other essentials of living® As the sample of
this survey covered only urban domestic households with
monthly consumption expenditure at the time of the survey
between HKS400 and HK$2,999, it is undeniable that our
estimates are truncated with resoect to the 'best fitting
line' showing the relation for the whole population.
Since Hong Kong's housing policies are used to relieve
the poor living conditions of lower-middle income class,
the truncation in estimation here should not affect the4
relevancy of our explanation for this sub-population.
For households occupying living quarters from
government or government subsidized organizations, expen¬
diture on housinc tends to be low comnared to those
occuping living quarters rented from private owners. For
this reason, the sampling method employed was a propor¬
tionate stratified selection of sampling units with each
stratum Stratification was made according to two factors
which were known to influence household expenditure.
They were type of housing and census district. In
this studv we icnore the oeocraohical implication and
only type of housing is taken into account. The reason
is that, as far as housing service is concerned, if
similar dwellings in different regions provide different
services, the rental payments must be different. With
this simplification we can handle cur analysis much more
easily. The importance to consider different type of
housing is because that the relative price of housing
service is arbitrarily lowered by government interventions
in the case of housing. Though a public housing unit is
providing the same amount of service as a private housing,
the rental charge is different because of government
subsidy.
In the survey 6,000 living quarters were selected
as the sample and 2,864 records of households were
completed. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of households
by type of housing.
As we have pointed out in section 2.3, all pre-war
built private dwelling units are under rental restriction
for a long period. The assumption of non —ciscriminaticn
prices of housing services does not hold in pre-war
Tab! a g.1
Distribution of Households by Type of Housing; in 19737
Type of Housing
As a 5b of
Total no. of Household?
Pre-War Built Private Dwelling Unii ?
Post-War Built Private Dwelling Uni 57.
Resettlement Estates Unii P
Government Low-Cost Housing 8c Housing
Authority 8c Housing Society Estates 14-6
Total 100.00
Source: Census and Statistics Department, The Household Expenditure Survey
1975-7- and The Consumer Price Indexes (Hong Kong: Government
Printer, 1975) i P- 16-
Note: Since April, 1973, Government Low-Cost Housing and Housing
Authority Estates have been renamed Housing Authority Group
A Estates, while Resettlement Estates have been renamed
; Housing Authority Group B Estates,
premisesIn the sample, only households residing in
dost—war built orivate dwellinas units are analysed®a-. -J J.
Insofar as we know that house purchases are regarded as
a kind of asset holding, expenditures of premises owners
not only reflect their consumption of ''housing services'5,
but also investment in assets® For this reason premises
7
owners are also excluded from our sample®' As the result
of all considerations above, our sample size is reduced
to 1085 numbers of households® The data are recorded in
punch cards and have been kindly provided by the Census
and Statistics Department for our analysis.
3®4 Special Considerations of Our Study
The basic conception of housing service, which we
have referred to in all preceding chapters is retained®
Needleman points out, If the price and availabi¬
lity of only part of housing supply is controlled, then in
a period of housing shortage, the excess demand will be
much higher than if control had never been imposed. See,
Lionel Needleman, The Economics of Housing, (London, 1965),
p® 163® If the mentioned effect is large enough rents for
post-war private housing become higher than if control had
never been imposed® On the other hand, since more flexible
rental restrictions are imoosed on cost-war hcusinc, it is
thought that there is no serious price discrimination®
7
As we have mentioned in section 1.2, by the results
of other housing economists, we believe that income elasti¬
city of home—owners is usual greater than that of renters®
As far as our public housing units are owned by the govern¬
ment so that only the renters consumption in housing are
relevant to our studv for comparison®
Once the homogeneous product housing service is defined
we can comoare the housina consumption of different house-X—'
holds with cross-sectional data. Before we go on to
formulate our statistical equations, it is necessary to
consider mere precisely the definitions of all variables.
3.41 Dependent Variables
Either rental expenditure (price of a unit of
standard housing service times units of standard housing
i
service), or units of standard housing service can be used
as the dependent variable in studying the housing service
demand. The meaning of standard housing service refers
o
to the quotation of Iiuth's statement in section 1.1.
If there is no price discrimination across households the
choice has no importance. But in practice the choice of
the analysis is dictated by the reliability and availabi-
litv of data. Since it is difficult to measure the units
-j.
of standard housing service consumed by an individual
household directly, we have to use recorded data in
rental expenditure. An advantage of using rental expen¬
diture as the dependent variable is that no difficulty is
encountered in the weighting problem of different types
of accommodation. Household rental payment is recorded
Q
Muth, Demand for Non-Farm Housing, pp. 32-33.
in the survey as the amount of money paid by a household
for the accommodation occupied durinq the survey month,
in addition to the consumption of hcusino servicea.—'
we are also interested in space demand for household.
It is noted chat space demand increases with household
size® It Is simply the result of need. Like the demand
for food, the demand for sheltering space is an undeni¬
able necessity of human life® he can conceive that for
two families with same income and other socio-economic
characteristics except family size, the larger household
would occupy mere space though its accommodation may be
worse In oualitv than that of the smaller household®J. -A-
This is because the quality of accommodation is influenced
by the effect of income per capita® Other things being
equal, the larger family would have smaller income per
capita and would need more space, and the only way it can
do in the consumption of housinc service with unchanced
income (total expenditure) is to reside in a larger fiat
of lower ouaiitv®
On the other hand, there are many service facili¬
ties forming the flow of housing service® These facilities
can be shared by all members of a household. If this is
9
Census ana Statistics Department, op. cit®, p® 17.
true, we may imagine that the consumption of ,Thousing
space is subject to scale of economy with respect to
family size. In the following analysis the area occupied
by an individual household is taken as the dependent
variable in the study of space demand. Cur data is
measured in sguare feet of effective sheltering area of
the accommodation. Thouah it can be thoucht of as a one-




For the definition of the independent variables,
the relevant considerations are more complex. In
equation (3.3) we have precisely pointed out that the
budget of a household is the main determining variable.
All economists note that a household's budget depends on
0
its income, but the dependence is not a static relation¬
ship but rather a dynamic one.
The income of a household and its need change
over time, and the income received in a particular period
may be a very poor indicator of its standard of living,
11
which is determined by the budget constraint. To the
10
See Richard Kuth, Urban Economic Problem (New
York: Haper Row, 1975), p. 113.
11
Prais and Houthakker, op. cit., p. 80.
extent that the Permanent Income Hypothesis is accepted,
it is known that the true determinant of the expenditure
pattern of a household in housing service is a complicat¬
ed function of past, present and expected incomes. As we
have mentioned in section 1.2 that if income effect is
measured by relating housing expenditure to current
income, the estimates will be substantially understated.
In addition to the difference between current
income and permanent income and their effects on
rental expenditure, the declared income of a household
12
also suffers from measuring error due to understatement.
Though Liviaton suggests that lagged income can be used
as an instrumental variable, it requires re-interview
data which is unavailable to us. It is because of the
availability and limitations of our recorded data, the
income effect dervied by relating rental expenditure to
household declared income is suspected to be substantially
underestimated.
The use of total expenditure as the determining
variable in deriving the Engel's Curve can be justified
12
For a detailed discussion, refer to section 1.2,
especially footnote 24.
13 Liviaton, Test of Permanent-Income Hypothesis,
pp. 29—59; and Lee, Housing and Income, pp. 480-88.
on the assumption that while total expenditure may depend
in a complicated way on income expectations and the like
rental expenditure depends on the level of total
14
expenditure.
Cne objection to the use of total expenditure as
the determining variable is the nature of the demand for
durable goods. As the survey is conducted for only a
month, if total expenditure is used to measure the
income effect, those households buying expensive dura¬
bles in the survey period will be placed in too high an
income group. That is, their expenditures on other
items will be more like those of households with a lower
15
to al expenditure. Fortunately, our record of expen¬
ditures on curable items which are not frequently incur¬
red are average payments over a period of 12 months, so
that the use of total expenditure would not substantially
overstate the income group of those households which
purchase durable goods in the period of survey. To a
certain extent, we assume our recorded total expenditure
data represent the permanent consumption expenditure of
the households.
14
For a further discussion see, W. Vickrey, Resource
Distribution Patterns and Classification of Families, in
National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Incomes
and Wealth, X (New York, 1952).
15
Prais and Houthakker, on. cit., p. 81.
In addition to considering the effects of incomei
variation, this study has been undertaken to ascertain
the influence of ct ner vsit is. bleSe The effect of particu¬
lar variables enter into the ceteris paribus assumption
of the demand function of housing service is also
studied. In our study, we focus on two sets of variables:
family size and socio-demographic characteristics of the
household head. Since our study is carried out by multi¬
ple recressicr., If there are hioh correlations between
income and uhe other variables, part of the effect attri¬
buted to the particular variable may actually be influen-
ced by income. Fortunately, in Table 3.2 and 3.3, the
correlation coefficients matrices show limited collinea-
rity between variables.
The consideration of household size as an inde¬
pendent variable is mainly due to two reasons. First,
as far as there is a positive correlation between house¬
hold size, in regression analysis biased estimates will
jL 6
result if household size is not explicitly treated.
Bias that originated. In this way is called
specification bias. Unless the left-out variable (fami iy
size) is not correlated with any of the independent
variables, ail coefficients will be biased due to such
kind of specification bias. See Polari Rao and Rogar
Lervy Killor, Applied Econometrics (New Delhi: Prentice-
Hall Ltd., 1972), pp. 29-32.
Table 3.2
Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Independent











expenditure 1.00000 0.38675 rt rrs Q c;-iU• vjUCyl 0.08391 n 1 g q=. ov.-«-— -0.11848
Household
size 0.38675 1.00000 0.20038 0.03313 0.10147 -O.I5872
Age 35-55 O.OO851 c.20038 i•00000 0 020-6• WC—1 •w' 0.02439
Age 55 0.08391 0.03313 -0.55533 1.00000 0.04754 0.10492
Social status 0.16959 0.1014? 0.02046 0.04754 1.00000 -0.09374
Sex -0.11848 -0.15872 0.02439 0.10492 -0.09374 1 r»oro.n_L« W Ky J J
Table 3.3
Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Independent











income 1.0000 0.43465 -0.01338 0.14307 0.27561 -0.12356
Household
size
0.43465 1.00000 0.20038 0.03313 0.10147 -0.15872
Age 35-55 -0.01338 0.20038 1.00000 -0.55533 0.02046 0.02439
Age y 55 0.14307 0.03313 -0.55533 1.00000 0.0A754 0.10992
Social status 0.27561 0.10147 0.02046 0.04754 1.00000 -0.09374
Sex
-0.12356 -0.15872 0.02439 0.104?2 -0.09374 1.00000
As household expenditure is used as the proxy for
permanent income, household size must explicitly enter
in the recression eauation as one of the independent
variables. Second, variations in household size are
believed to have substantial effect on housing consump¬
tion, Particularly, the demand for space is influenced
greatly by the size of the family. This again suggests
that it is necessary to take into account household size
explicitly in the formulation of the consumption function.
3y observing the tabulated result, it is noted
that households with heads being employers spend larger
shares of their total expenditures on housing.' First,
it may be directly explained that it is a matter of taste.
Second, one may sucoest that there is a positive correla-
tion between social status and income, which has not been
shown in the household total expenditure. If housing con¬
sumption is correlated with incomes rather than household
total expenditure, then a positive coefficient of social
status must be interpreted as a constitutional part of
the income effect. This argument is presented by
Fiaure 3.1.
17

















The lines indicate positive relationships amonc4- L s
variables with given directions All dashed lines are
those relationships which are unobservable since the
linking variable, permanent income is unknown. It is
believed that rental expenditure is determined by per¬
manent 'income with path (a), and (a) is not observable.
In empirical research only (b) and (c) can be observed.
Without considering the difference in taste, and only
accepting (b) to explain the influence of permanent income
4
is based on the assumption that there is a stable func¬
tional relationship between household's total expenditure
and its permanent income, and the relationship is inde¬
pendent of social status of the household head. With
respect to social status, one might reason that it
affects rental expenditure via permanent income. It is
found by Fisher that those groups with mere variable
income have higher saving ratios,, To the extent that
employers' incomes are more unstable than employees',
then at the same expenditure level an employer's
permanent income is always higher than an employee's.
In other words, with similar permanent income, an em¬
ployer always has lower expenditure level. If there is
no difference in taste, an employer will spend less on
housing as well as other consumption items. Then we just
cannot argue that social status affects rental expendi¬
ture via (a). For this reason and returning to equation
(3.3), the variable social status does not enter as a
constitutional Dart of m but only as an indeoencent
variable t_r• That is to say, it affects rental
expenditure via (c).
In addition to the dummy variable social status,
we further include other socio—demographic factors that
influence a household's consumption of housing service.
Aqe and sex of heads of households are considered as in¬
dependent variables. Such factors are related ro a
number of individual attitudes, and they influence the
18
K. R. Fisher, Explorations in Saving behaviour,
Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Statistics,
XVIII (August, 1960, pp. 229-63.
willingness as well as ability to consume• Relating
age and the lire cycle to income and consumeticn, it is
found that variations in the ratio of particular expen-
diture to total expenditure is not only influenced by
different family size and income but to certain extent
P9_
by different stages of the family life cycle. In the
following the age of heads of households may be interpre¬
ted as an index of the family life cycle. Even though
the information of age is Quantitative in nature, it canZJ j. 7
not be used linearly in the recression ecuaticn to obtainU.—'—
any meaningful interpretation of the resultant coeffi-
cients in explaining the family life cycle. One way out
of this difficulty is to treat the available information
of age as qualitative rather than quantitative. The
technique of dummy variable is used to divided the age
groups into three categories as young family, middle-
aged family and old family in order to observe the
effects of family life cycle.
19
For particular interest in this point of view see
Janet Fisher, Family Life Cycle Analysis on Research on
Consumer Behaviour, in The Life Cycle and Consumer
Rphflvi nnr- hv T,_ H_ C1 ps rV (Nw vorV r:r_? 1« S_—'»— J'' A W w N•'— —r—' V» -W %J
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There are various studies considering a linear
relationship between ages and housing expenditure, for
instances, see Lee, Housing and Income, pp. 480-90; and
DeSalvo, Benefits and Costs of Housing Program, pp. 771-
88; and there are also some studies with emphasis on life
cycle classification, see Alan R. Winger, An approach To
Measure Potential Upgrading Demand in the Housing Karhet,'
Review of Economics and Statistics XLV (Auoust, 1963),
pp. 239-44; and Carliner, op. cit., pp. 528-32.
Along the line suggested by other housing econo¬
mists we also insert the sex of heads of households as
a social variable which influences the attitude of house-
hold's demand for housing.,~ In our cross-section
analysis the inclusion of sex is not trying to determin¬
ate whether there is sexual discrimination in the housing
market. Considering housing expenditure variations as a
complex outcome of socio-economic variables, sex is
merely treated as a factor that determines the choice
through multiple interactions with other variables. In
our study no special emphasis is placed on the sex
variable.
Before we go on to estimate our regression equa¬
tions we want to summarize cur discussions on independent
variables of the equation describing housing consumption.
Differences in housing consumption pattern of households
are, in economic analysis, attributed to variations in
the permanent incomes of households, for which households'
total expenditures are used as the proxy. Differences
which have not been explained by total expenditure varia¬
tions are attributed to non-economic factors, such as the
21
See Lee, Housing and Income, pp. 480-90:
DeSalvo, Benefits and Costs of Housing Procram,
pp. 771-88. Carliner, op. cit., pp. 528-32.
hybrid concept of difference in taste. To observe the
major cause of such differences, variations in size and
22
other particulars of a household enter explicitly in
the equation specification. It is a job for us to find
whether these (non-economic) factors acccuns for some
variations and reduce considerably the residual variation
2 3
in the regression equation of housing consumption.
3.5 The Estimation of Statistical Relationshins-- j.. 1._
Before we go on with cur study, one point which
must be kept in mind is that as we accent the concent of— - —
housing service, the rental expenditure is the measure of
housing service consumption. Cur estimation of statisti¬
cal relationships is based on a basic form with double-loq
transformation. Mathematically, it is expressed as
follows,




particulars means the ace, sex anc social status
of the household head.
2
See S. J. Prais, 'TMen-Linear Estimates of the Ingei
Curves, Review of Economics and Statistics XX (1952-53),
p. 88.
where denotes the rental payment of the i-th
hou sehold,
(A denotes its total expenditure,
is household size®
and are dummy variables of the age of
the household head is in the range of 35 to
55 years= 1, and A„= 1 if his ages is
greater than 55. It means represents
middle-aged and A-represents eld house¬
hold heado The younger head with 0 dummy
variable and its effect appears on the
intercept term.
St denotes the dummy variable recresentine
-L—_
the social status of the household head,
with St= 1 if he is an employer, otherwise,
St= 0.
Sex is the dummy variable concerning the sex
of household head. It is equal to 1 for a
female headed household and 0 for a male
headed household-
The interpretation of our model is given as fellows
family with a younger head whose age is less than 35 years,
and he is a male and he is not an employer; then there will
be 0 values in all dummy variables and the intercept is
simply Bo For a family with middle-aged, female, employ¬
er head the dummy variables are= 1, A-= C, St=l and Sex=l;
and the interceut is (B+ B0+ Br+ Br). The expression
of (3.7) represents constant elasticities of rental exoen-
diture with respect to total expenditure and family size.
As far as total expenditure is the proxy for permanent
income, (3.7) also implies a constant income elasticity
of housing consumption.i
With the same notations for all variables, except
total expenditure is replaced by declared income, Y.,
another equation (3.8) is formed as,
(3.8)
The interpretations of the D's in equation (3.8)
are not different from the B's in equation (3.7) with the
only exception that is the declared income elasticityJL.
and is the 'total expenditure elasticity' of housing
consumption. Applying ordinary least square method, the
estimated results of equations (3.7) and (3.8) are presen¬
ted by. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
In Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 standard errors are
shown below their respective regression coefficients.
The F ratio is calculated as the square value of regression
coefficient divided by its standard error; it is equal to
Table B.A
Rental Expenditure as A Function of Total Expenditure
and Household Characteristics
For Post-War Built Private Dwellings in Eong Kong
Metropolitan Area. 1973-197A













In (total expenditure) 0.88360
(0.07125)
153.787 0.39305




age between 35-55 -0.1b092
(0.06731)
j• -O.O0826
age greater than 33 -0.09912
(0.08083)
1 gnuJl•» -0.04229







Multiple correlation coefficient R= O.AH38
Coefficient of determination H2= 0.16940
Standard Error S= 0.87457
F statistic F= 38.6A163
Number of observations n= IO85
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses below their respective
regression coefficients.
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 3% level
of the F test.
Rental Expenditure as'A Function of Declared Income
and Household dharantpriPitirR
For Post-war Built Private Dwellings in Hong Kong
Metropolitan Area, 1973-1974
(Expenditure Ranee HKS400-HK£2.990)
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114.226 0.33153












Knri al statiiR n oooni
(o.000811
8.997 0.08837




PcrT»aj.cH on K+ 0+ -1 r+ cr•
Multiple correlation coefficient R= 0.37661
Hoef f 5 c i pnt of dtprminati nn R= 0.1183
Standard Error s= 0.88896
T cr+ a+-? c 4- r+ F= 20.69449
Number of observations a= IO85
%
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses below their respective regression
rnpffiripnts.
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 5% leve!
nf t.h P T? f pcf.
2
t and the test of significance refers to F statistics.
The symbol denotes those coefficients which are signi¬
ficantly different from zero at the 5% level of one-tail
4- 4- 24teste
2
Comparing the results, we find that a of equaticr
(3o8), and also the F statistics reveal the same story of
'goodness to fit. Since all the dependent and indepen¬
dent variables are specified in the same wav except C. anc
Y, it provides us a common ground for comparison of the
relative performance of these two equations. In leads us
to accept e eras mien (3.7) which furnishes a better basis
for statistical inference in explaining the movements of
the dependent variable. For this reason and accompanied
by the theoretical aspects which we have discussed in
section 3.4, we concentrate our discussions on the ex¬
planation cf the results in Table 3.4.
Before we continue with our key discussions one
may wonder why the regression constants in Table 3.4 are
negative and in Table 3.5 positive. It is a trival case
as in equation (3.7) that the value of In is negative
when all independent variables are set to zero. The
mathematical interpretation of the intercept does not
24
Note that the 5% significant level of F distri¬
bution corresponds to 2.5% of t distribution«
always have an operational economic interpretation, V.e
have to limit ourselves within the relevant ranee of the
variables. Cn the other hand the regression constant must
be interpreted as the mean effect on In R. of ail excludedl
2 5
variables for the relevant population. It is used for
prediction purpose only.
To compare the size of coefficients, it is inappro-
i
priate just to compare the values of B's. This is because
the independent variables are measured in different units.
For a comparison of the relative size of influence'', zhe
estimates of coefficients by normalized regression equation
should be used. These are the b's. They are equivalent
to the partial correlation coefficients and their values
represent the size of influence. Furthermore, there is
no regression constant in the normalized estimation. In
our regression equation B.= b.. S Sn. where S. is the
standard deviation of the k-th variable and S is the
o
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standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Let us return to the analysis of our estimates in
equation (3.7). Though coefficients of age, sex and
25
For these points one may find interesting elabora¬
tion in Rac and Killer, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
2 6
The proof of these points can be found in
Johnston, or. cit., pp. 132-35.
household size are. insignificant, we still have tc dis¬
cuss the signs and the meaning of insignificance of these
variables as long as the regression equation is dictasec
by cur theoretical considerations. The insignificance of
the sex variable leads us to conclude that no particular
difference in taste on housing consumeticn between male
and female headed households. The necative signs of the
age variable indicate that at a given expenditure level
the middle—aged head consumes less housing, but the
effects of age is not precise as the coefficients are
insignificant. Me have to note that we can net reject
the family life cycle hypothesis with this result. It is
because that the life cycle of a family is related to the
household size as well as income and aqe of the household
head. An older household with same household size may
contain more income-earning adults and spend more. Cur
results only lead us to conclude that at a given expendi¬
ture level there is no difference in taste on housino
consumption with respect to different age of household
heads. On the other hand, the significance of social
status variable indicates that employers are spending more
in housing than non-employers at the same expenditure
level. It shows that there is difference in taste as
far as social status is concerned.
Now let us turn to the crucial elements deter¬
mining housing consumption- Comparing the size of b's
gives us the information that total expenditure is a
dominant variable and its normalized regression coeffi¬
cient is C.39305, which is near twenty times in size of
other coefficients except the coefficient of social
status- Tctal expenditure dominates ail the other vari-
ables in regression and accounts for all variations in the
dependent variable. As Rao and Miller point cut, this
situation occurs in empirical research where the dependent
variable is sore how functionally related to an indepen-
2 7
dent variable m fixed proportions.
To examine the fixed proportions relationships
between rental expenditure and total expenditure, it is
found that the expenditure elasticity of housing demand is
0.88360, which is not significantly different from unity
at 5% level of the t test. (1-0.88360C.07125=
1.6336). Torsi-expenditure is the proxy for permanent
income, and the permanent income elasticity of housing
demand is the product of expenditure elasticity of housing
demand times the income elasticity of total expenditure.
27
Rao and Killer, op. cit., p. 40.
(~ G
where j. denotes permanent income.
tl is the permanent income elasticity
service demand.
'I is the total expend inure e 1 as tic i tv
of housing service demand.
a~ j is the permanent income elasticity
of total expenditure.A.
R denotes the renual payment (amount of
housinc service).'
C is total expenditure, and I is permanent
income.
Cur measured total expenditure represents permanentA. i_
«
consumption of a household if the survey is long enough
and the transitory components are offset by a large
sample. Admittedly, permanently income hypothesis allows
us to assume approaches unity, the. It
means the expenditure elasticity to certain extent can be
interpreted as permanent income elasticity, of which the
value is not significant different, from one. ur fincinc
is supported by Reid's and Lee's estimates which ore C.8
p 8
and 0.85 respectively.~
315.2 Exploration of Household Size Elasticity and A
Study of Homogeneity Hypothesis in Housing Service
Consumption (Supplementary Test of Unitary Expendi¬
ture Elasticity)
The insignificance of the household size coeffi¬
cient shows a more complex phenomenon emerging from the
interaction between total expenditure and household size.
With reference to the correlation coefficients matrix of
Table 3.2 and adopting the partial correlation coefficient











Figure 3.2 shows that variations in household
size does not cause variations in rental expenditure
2 8
Reid, Housing and Income; and Lee, Housing and
Income, pp. 480-90. Cf. all the estimates that summari¬
zed in section 1.2 especially the results of Kuth.
since the partial correlation coefficient of these two
variables is very small. As there is a relatively large
positive correlation between household size and total
expenditure, it is thought that the causal process of
household size influencing rental expenditure is through
the variable total expenditure, which is by far the
dominant variable. This implies that at a given expendi¬
ture level (assumina the same permanent income level),
a larger household spends the same budget share in housing
as a smaller household. Furthermore, as Kouthakker notes
that the elasticity of household size on consumption of
a particular commodity is a combination of need effect and
29
(per capita) income effect. A larger family needs more
housing service (especially more sheltering space), but it
has a smaller per capita income and may spend less on
housing. The need effect is always positive and the (per
capita) income effect is' always negative with increase in
29
The need effect results from the increase in the
need for various commodities when family size increases.
The increase in need is usually less than proportional to
the increase in size because of economies of scale in
large families. In income effect, an increase in family
size makes people relatively poor. Although an increase
in family size may increase a household's need for hous¬
ing, the simultaneous increase in need for mere food may-
force it to spend less on housing in balance. See H. S.
Houthakker, An International Comparison of Household
Expenditure Patterns, Commemorating The Centenary of
Engel's Law, Eccnometrica, XXV (Oct., 1957), p. 544.
household size. In balance, they result in an insigni¬
ficant household size coefficient with respect to rental
expenditure.
A related question is the homogeneity hypothesis
and its implications on household size variations. The
homogeneity hypothesis supposes that housing service con¬
sumption per person depends on the level of expenditure
(income) per person. As this hypothesis asserts the
working assumption that there is no economy of scale on
housing service consumption, it implies
( 3.1O)
which relates housing service R to total expenditure C
and household size N in a homogeneous function of degree
one. Such that when an arbitrary scale factor is
multiplied to C and N, R will increase to R. That is
(3.11)
Revrite equation (3.10) and (3.11) as is set at
1/N, we obtain
(3.12)
A dcuble-log form regression equation is performed
to test the 'appropriateness' of this equation, which is,
(2.13)
ASt and Sex are dummy variables and their
interpretations are similar to equation (3.7). (RN).
is the rental payment per capita of the i-th household
and (CN). is the expenditure per capita of the i-th
household. The results of the regression coefficients
are presented in Table 3.6.
The notations and their interpretations of Table
3.6 are not different from Table 3.4. With this regres¬
sion equation based on the homogeneity hypothesis, the
expenditure elasticity approaches one. in regression
equation (3.13) the age coefficients are significant.
This econometric model shows that at given expenditure
per capita, a household with a middle-aged1' head would
spend less on housing than a household with a young
head. It shows the willingness in demand for housing by
4
a young family. Adopting the homogeneity hypothesis and
applied Euler's Theorem on homogeneous function, then
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Multiple correlation coefficient R= 0.53554
Coefficient of determination R= 0.28680
Standard error S= 0.72937
F statistic F= 86.70003
Number of observations n= 1085
Notes: standard errors are shown below their respective regression
coefficients.
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 5% level
of F test.
From equation (3.15) we conclude that if the house¬
hold size elasticity on housing service demand shows little
significant then it is predictable that the expenditure
elasticity is around unity. Since 'total expenditure' is
the proxy of permanent income, we expect there is an
unitary income elasticity of housing service demand.
3.5.3 A Study of Scale Economy of Housing Space Demand
From, the conclusion above, we note that there is
constant return to scale in housing service consumption
which is measured by rental expenditure and the result is
independent of household size. Now we turn to the question
of scale economy in space demand for sheltering with
variations in household size. Without any chance of the
independent variables, we only change the dependent vari¬
able, which becomes the area (measured in square feet)
occupied by a household. The regression equation is,
(3.6)
By the results in Table 3.7 and by the analysis
of Table 3.4 and Table 3.6, we have the following conclu¬
sions. Regarding the sex variable, it shows insignificant
influence on both 'space demand' and 'service demand' for
housing. With the positive significance of the variable
social status, it is expected that the employers occupy
Tab] 3.7
Area Occupied as A Function of Total Expenditure
and Household Characteristics













yo rrrac c-! r n finncfant
-1.44723
In (total expenditure) n RU71R
(0.04501)
350.942 0.49221
In (household size) n. QQ'7
(0.04497)
50.629 0.19256
age between 33-33 0.1396
(0.04250)
13.293 0.10399
age greater than 33 0.22366
(0.05105)
19-540 0.12632.
social status n pRno
(0.66070)
21.418 0.10894





Mutiple correlation coefficient R= 0.65597
Ooe f f i r.i en t. nf riet.ermi nsti nri R= 0.43030
Standard error s= 0.55219n
F statistic -?= 135-57594
Number nf nhservat-i nns n= 10o5
Notes: standard errors are shown belowr their respective regression
r no F f t n n f c
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 5% ot
F test
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more space and spend more on housing expenditure at a
qiven total expenditure level. To consider the ace vari-
able we know that the household with an "old" head occu*
pies more space but spend no more in rental payment
Ceteris paribus. It leads us to predict that a younger
family spends more in housing not because of the creater
demand for 'space' but because it demand for ' better
qualityh of home'. 30 On the other hand, an elder family
occupies' larger space' without spending more means that
it is living in a lower quality house. The expenditure
elasticity of 'spatial demand' shows little difference
from the expenditure elasticity of 'service demand' and
it is needless to repeat the elaborations.
The most interesting finding in Table 3.7 is the
variations of 'space demand' with respect to household
size variations. The household size elasticity of spatce
demand is significatly smaller than one and greater than
zero. It means. an additional member to a household makes
it demand more space but with less average area per capita.
To illustrate the last point a simple mathematical elabora-
tion is presented as follows
30 The rental expenditure elasticity, in fact, is the
sum of the 'spatce elasticity'(quantity elasticity) and
the quality elasticity.
.(3.17)
where A denotes the occupies area, C and N denotes
total household exnenditure and household sizeX.
respectively.
The equation cf average area per capita as a
function of total expenditure and household size is
expressed as,
(3.16)




From (3.18) we obtain
and
rewrite the above equation accompanied by sub¬
stitution from equation (3.18).
(3.20)
Compare (3.19) and (3.20) we know that b must be
negative. In the mathematical work that we have done, we
predict that in a regression equation of (3.18) the
coefficient of household size will be necative. A new
regression equation is formed as
(3.21)
The regression results are presented in Table 3.8
and 2°- equation (3.21) is negatively significant.
With all the above findings we conclude that there is
economy of scale in space demand. The arguments in
section 3.4 is now suooorted by our empirical work. Though
equations (3.16) and (3.21) are based on different assump-
31
tions, the signs and magnitudes of the estimates consis¬
tently show- that there is economy of scale in space
demand. The interpretations of Table 3.8 is simple and
there is no need to repeat all the arguments.
3.6 A Summary of Findings
A wide range of topics concerning housing consum¬
ption has been studies. Now we have a summary of the
31
Equation (3.21) is based on the assumptions that
marginal propensities to consume in housinc space with
respect to total expenditure and household size are con¬
stant. It is different from equation (3.16) which is
based on the assumption of constant elasticipies. The
results of these different formulations of regression
model are not comparable.
Table 6.8
Area Occupied Per Capita as a Function of Tocal
Expenditure and Household Characteristics
For Post-War Built Private Dwellings in Hong Kong
Vpf.rnnnl itsri A T A p._ 1 Q7-1 074
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denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 57 o
major findings from the estimations of the behavioural
equations. Instead of repeating all discussions, only a
few points are stressed as follows:
First, total expenditure is considered to give
a good measure of permanent income. If the Income
elasticity of total expenditure is equal to unity, then
the housing service demand elasticity with respect to
total expenditure is equal to the income elasticity of
housing service demand. Cur estimate shows that the
expenditure elasticity of housing service demand is not
significantly different from one and it implies the rent-
3 2
expenditure ratio is not a function of total expenditure.
These findings fulfil the constraint of unitary income
elasticity of housing demand in the Cobb-Douglas utility
function. As the groundwork for the following chapter,
a function is estimated by relating rent-expenditure ratio
to family size, age, sex and social status of household




With similar accroach as the develcement of equa-
tions (3.17) to (3.20), one can easily proves this statement.
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where bi is the ratio of monthly rent to monthly
rental expenditure, and all other independent variables
are the same as in equation (3.7). The regression equa-
tion is found to be significant with an F ratio of
6.66634; but the coefficient of determination is only
0.03054 and the standard error is 0.08109. The sample
mean of rent-expenditure ratio is 0.1777. These findings
are very useful in the estimation of tenant net benefits,
which is performed in the next chapter.
Second, the homogeneity characteristic of housing
service demand implies that consumption in housing per
capita depends on the level of average expenditure( or
income) per capita.
Third, as variations of "space demand" is related
to household size variations, and that there are "economies
of scale" in larger families in space consumption.
3.7 Limitations of Our Study
Firstly, our estimation equations are expressed in
double-log form which is built on the assumption of cons-
tant elasticities. As Houthakker notes,
"...... the assumed constancy of elasticities
can only be satisfied approximately and over
limited ranges of total expenditure. This is
a well-known defect of double-logarithmic Engel
curves which has to be offset against their
many advantages such as good fit, ease of
123
computation, and automatic correction for
heterosedasticity."33
The double-logarithmic form is not the unique
formulation in deriving Engel's Curve. It is possible
to obtain a better estimate by another form, for instance,
semi-logarithmic form.34
Secondly, the estimate of expenditure elasticity
with ordinary square method may be bias due to the
simultaneous error. This point has been elaborated by
Liviaton.35
Thridly, our study is limited by constraints in
basic assumptions of budget studies. In thediscussion of
section 3.2 we noted that our theory is developed in a
static character. In a cross-section study by household
expenditure survey for a short period of time, little can
be done about time-lags. Because of the limitations of
our data we can not follow the instrumental variable
method suggested by liviaton and adopted by Lee in housing
study.36 This approach to analyse permanent income effect
33 Houthakker, op. cit., p.543.
34 See S.J. Prais, "Engel Curve,"pp. 87-104.
35 Liviaton, "Errors in Variables and Engel Curve
Analysis," pp. 337-38.
36 Liviaton, "Test of the Permanent Inceme Hypothe-
sis,"pp. 29-59; and Lee, "Housing and Income" pp.480-
88.
on consumption requires two years or three years reinter-
view data, which is unavailable to us. Because of the
basic characteristics of our data, we have not considered
the transitcrv comnonents in both the dependent anc
independent variables.
And finally, our study is based on the assumption
of the absence of interdependence of preference function.
The validity of this simplification has been questioned by
37
Tobin and otner economists. Particularly, it is noted
that housing consumption generates a considerable demon¬
stration effect which leads to a pattern that housing
consumption is not only dependent upon the household's
income but also the level of housing service consumed by
other households. 'If the neighborhood effect is also
taken into account, the aggregative forecasts by our
estimates requires much more correction. In so far as
our estimates are truncated and no information on the
38
interdependence multiplier is known, it is inappropriate
3 7
James icbm, Relative Income, Absolute Income and
Saving, in honey, Trade and Economic Growth: in Honour of
J. Ho Williams ed. by D, M, Wright and others (New York:
Macm.illan, 19 31); and J. S. Duesenbery, Income, Saving and
The Theory of Consumer Behaviour (Cambridge Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1949).
3 8
The meaning of interdependence multiplier refers to
Harry G. Johnson, The Effects of Income-Redistribution on
Aggregate Consumption with Interdependence of Consumers'
Preference, Economica XIX (1952), p„ 131.
to apply cur estimates as the coefficients of the bes
fitting line1' for the whole population and use our
estimates for forecasting at the aggregate level.
CHAPTRP TV
THE DISTRIBUTION CP HCUSING SERVICES, SUBSIDIES
AND BENEFITS IN GOVERNMENT LOW-COST HOUSING
4.1 The Objective of This Chapter
Before we go on with our discussion we stress
once again that the term tenant used in this text means
actually tenant household. In the preceding chapter we
covered a range of topics concerning the consumption of
housing service in the private rental sector. It is the
task of this chanter to orovide an analvsis of housirc
service consumed in public housing sector. This chapter
applies the methodology developed by DeSalvo to evaluate
housing programs thdt are primarily intended to provide
their tenant households with adequate housing at below-
market rents.- As we emphasized in Chapters I and II,
such kind of housing programs is essentially transfer in-
kind to its tenant households. In accordance with the
efficiency criteria there should be tax-payers (non¬
tenants) benefits due to housing consumption externali¬
ties. Subsidized public housing programs require economic.
-t
x DeSalvo, A Methodology for Evaluating Housing
Programs, pp. 173-83.
resources, the cost of which is borne by tax-pavers.
Here we have to know how much of the cost in public
housing is borne by tenant households and how much by
tax-pavers. This chapter focuses on the distribution of
housing services, nominal subsidies and tenant net
benefits. The difference between nominal subsidies and
tenant net benefits is the additional cost of transfer
in-kind over transfers in-cash. With respect to the re-
distributive intent of this program, we estimate how
housing services, subsidies and benefits are distributed
by characteristics of the target population, such as
income and family size. Along the methodology that has
been developed, there is no distinction in theoretical
aspect of our study from previous studies. Our main
interest is to apply the theory to the case of Government
Low-Cost Housing (GLCH) in Hong Kong. Despite of the
importance of our public housing programs, surprisingly
no rigorous empirical economic analysis has been done to
evaluate their performance. Thou'gh what we have done in
this chapter is limited, the method is generally applica¬
ble to analyse any other housing programthe main coal of
which is to provide subsidized housing to certain groups
of the general population, such as Resettlement Estates,
Housing Authority and Housing Society Estates. This
method is not the unique approach to evaluate public
housing programs; there are other alternative formula¬
tions by different specification and estimationA.
2
considerata ens•
Due re limitations in our data, this approach is
the most appropriate one, which can give us more meaning¬
ful results. Hopefully, our study will stimulate others
to do more empirical economic research in the area of
oublic housinc in Hone Koncr.
4.2 Preview of Government Low—Cost HousingII I —MBM—Ml W I —I——MM———I 11 I— —T11 I~ M~ I I mmMBIMI I I i MM!—Ill II
Government Low-Cost Housing in Hong Kong commenced
in 1963« Cn 31 Kerch, 1972 the number of this type of
housing units was 49,083 accommodating 231,400 persons,
3
around 5.6% of the whole population. This program was
designed to provide homes to low-income families who were
living in over-crowded and sub-standard accommodations.
Blocks were built by Public Works Department, and managed
«
by the Housing Authority for the government. The units
are small self-contained flat and space is allocated at
the rate of 35 square feet for each adult. Rents charged
2
Cf. Smolensky, op. cit., pp. 94-101; Bish, op. cit.,
pp. 425-38; anc Murray, op. cit., pp. 771-88.
3
Calculation based on the data of Housing Board,
op. cit., p. 18.
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for these premises are subsidized by the government with
a combination of low initial costs of land plus low
interest rate. Rents are determined on a cost basis.
Land acquirement cost of GLCH is well below market value,
and rents in GLCH are calculated to cover the original
capital costs in 40 years at 5% interest. Rents vary
according to the size of flat. GLCH is financed by the
government, and the costs of subsidies are borne by tax-
payers. The quality of GLCH units are not much different
from post war flats except smaller in size.
Tenant eligibility is determined by income and
family size: accessed family inceme must not exceed
HK$500 per month in 1973 and the household must have three
or more members. The income limit of eligibility is only
a historical standard and in actual application the
administration precedure is more flexible.After the
reorganization of the Housing Authority on 1st April 1973,
GLCH is grouped as a component of Group A Estates and the
income limit of admission is continuously upward adjusted.
It is generally accepted that GLCH is intended to benfit
lower-income families and especially those with children.
One thing which is extremely important is that once
GLCH is assigned to a family, there is no income limit at
which tenant households have to move out from their
130
dwellings. In the course of time, most of the tenant
household incomes exceed far beyond the limits of eligi-
bility. According to Hopkins' survey, in 1969 almost
two-thirds of the households living in GLCH had inccmes of
over HK$550 per month.4 Table 4.1 compares the means of
household characteristics for GICH residents with those
residents of post-war private rental dwellings in metro-
politan Hong Kong in 1973-1974. For GLCH tenants the low
declared incomes compared to household expenditures may be
explained as a common feature that public housing tenants
alwaystunderstate their incomes substantially. However,
on average, these households have lower incomes and larger
family size.
4.3 Diagramatical Analysis of Costs and Benefits
In GLCH program a household is not given the
option of determining the type of housing it wishes. It
either accepts a particular unit( at the subsidized rent)
or not at all. To simplify the analysis, we consider a
household6 in a two commodity word; the goods are housing
4. Hopkins, "housing the poor, " p.328.
5 This section follows the formulation of DeSalvo.
See DeSalvo "A Methodolgy for Evaluaton Housing Program,"
pp.173-83.
6. A household is considered as a unit of decision
concerning consumption cheice.
Table 4.1
Comparison of Characteristics of Households in GLGH
and Post-War Built Private Rental Sector in
Metropolitan Hong Kong;
Expenditure Range HK$400-HK$2,999 (1973-1974)
Household Characteristics GLCH Post-War Built
Priyate Rental Sector























Sample Size 154 1085
Note: standard errors are shown in parentheses under thier respective
mean values.
service, K and non-housing goods, X; with market prices
P, and P resoectivelv. (The public housinc program is
assumed to leave F, and P unaffected). Ficure 4.1 is
used to illustrate this situation. Before roving into
public housing, the household is confronted with the
budget constraint given by,
i L
where y is its budget constraint (shown as irr
Figure 4„ 1).
Under free market conditions, the household maxi¬
mize its utiiifv by purchasing X. units of non-housing
goods and of housing, which entails a rental expendi-
ture of
As the household's choice under market prices is
indicated by (X, K), its budget constraint L. is
associated with a utility level lb.
As the household is permitted to participate in
GLCH program, a particular unit is assigned to it. The
vertical line Fb represents the fixed amount of housing
service which the tenant household must purchase. The
housinc program also allows the tenant household to
purchase at less than market rent. Suppose the
assianed unit for which the market rent is R= P, Hn,
Figure 4.1
and now the household only has to pay
( 0 a 1)
where R is the actual paid rent.
After joining the GLCH, tenant household still
has an unchanged income Y, and faces the same market price
of non—housing goods, P. It is reauired to pav R for
the GLCH unit which is producing amount of housing
service. As the tenant household purchase amount of
non-housing goods, its choice is therefore(? RU) and is
associated with a utility level Up• As far as GLCH is
designed to improve the living conditions of low-income
families, it is conceivable that Hp is always, fixed in
areater amount than H„• U0 is also expected t o be nicner
than U1 since the program is participated voluntarily.
So far in the discussion of this thesis, we have
adopted the concept of housing service and resource cost
is defined as the value of resources used to provide the
flow of services from a housing unit. To estimate the
resource cost of a housing program directly would require
extensive cost data on initial investment and subsequent
operating expenses. On the other hand, economic theory
tells us that in the long-run under a competitive market,
the market price of a unit of housing service will be equal
to the average cost of providing it. By the assumption
that GLCH is operated as efficient as the private rental
sector, the resource costs of its dwellings are equal to
their market rent. In Figure 4.1 the market rent
(resource cost) of a subsidized GLCH unit is given by AD.
It can be written as,
'where C denotes the resource cost,
R is the market rent,
m
In Figure 4.1 the actual rent paid by the tenant
household for the amount of housing services 'is given
by ABe It is written as,
( nV t± i
where R denotes actual rent paid by the tenant
P
household•
The amount of subsidy (nominal benefit) distribu¬
ted to the tenant household by means of GLCH is equal to
the difference between market rent, R and actual paid7 m




where S denotes the subsidy distributed to the
tenant household.
The cost of such subsidy is borne by tax-payers.
It can be proved easily by recalling that resource cost is
equal to market rent. Since the resource cost is the sum
of tenant household's raid rent and tax-oayers contribu-
tion, then che subsidy becomes the cost borne by tax¬
payers. Mathematically it is proved as follows,
then,
where C is the contributions of tax-pavers (cost
of transfer in-kind imposed on society).
In chapter I, it has stressed the difference in
conception and magnitude of subsidy (nominal benefit) and
tenant net benefit. Applying the price equivalent vari¬
ation of consumer's surplus, tenant net benefit is defined
as by how much additional money income the household would
reauire In order to be as well off without joinina the
program. In Figure 4.1 this amount of tenant net benefit
is denoted as EC. As we have mentioned, subsidy (tax¬
payers1 contributions) is equal to BD, Then the minimum
amount of tax-payers benefits necessary to justify the
program or: benefit-cost grounds is CD. For (ID represents
the additional cost of transfer in-kind over transfer
in-cash. It is the difference between the subsidv BD and
tenant net benefits 5C will never exceed the subsidy.
Consequently, economic justification of transfer in-
housing must depend on the existence and magnitude of
tax-payers benefits, which as stated above is due to
externalities in housing consumption. The minimum
amount- of tax-payers benefits necessary to justify such
program on benefit-cost grounds is provided in this
text. It is measured by the difference between subsidy
and tenant net benefit.
S
4.4 The Methodolooy of ustimatina Costs and benefits
The housing service of a GLCH equals to its market
rent, R= P, H~ which is also assumed to be eoual to the
resource costs as R= C. Since GLCH is not offered in
m
the private rental sector, its market rent can not be
observed directly. Perhaps the easiest way is simply to
ask someone with knowledge of the housing market in which
the program, operates to estimate the market rents of the
7
As physical externalities are major components of
overall externalities in housing consumption, it has been
recognized by the government that bad housing creates
external costs. See Hong Kong Government, Review of
Policies for Squatters Control, Resettlement and Govern-
ment Low-Cost Housing, 1964 (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1964), p. 19.
o
This section fellows the analvsis of DeSalvo andu.
Murray; see DeSalvo, op. cit., pp. 173-83; and Murray,
op. cit., pp. 771-88.
program units There are undoubtedly other approaches
as well. Since other accroaches recuire much more
information ana it is difficult to rank quality according
to its characteristics, v;e have to adopt the most con¬
venient wav cc estimate the market rent.
The measure of housing subsidy is directly esti¬
mated by the formulation of S= R- R. If v;e know the
magnitudes of market rent and the tenant household's paid
rent then the amount of subsidy can be obtained easily.
To obtain the measure of tenant net benefit, an
ordinal utility function has to be defined. It follow as,
(4.1)
where X is non-housing goods and H is housing
service. It is assumed that the utility function is
twice differentiable -with strictly positive first
From the utility function (4.1) and the budget
constraint, we define the indirect utility function
(the Lagrancian) as,
9
QeSalvc has applied this method an has analysas
of New York City's Mitchell-Lama Housing Program; see
DeSalvo, Benefits and Costs of Housing Frocram, p. 759,
10
Another approach would be to estimate a rent
function for the market rent of the program units. This
method has been adopted by Oslen in his study of rent
control. See Edgar C. Cslen, An Economic Analysis of
Rent Control, Journal of Political Economy, LXXX (Sect.
Oct., 1972), pp. 1081-1100.
(4.2)
where L is the Lagrangian Multiplier. Maximazing
V of (4.2) gives the highest level of U attainable. Given
Y, P, and P the Hicksian measure of benefit is,
(4.3)
where Y denotes tenant household's original
o
income, and g indicates the solution of (4.2) for Y as a
function of maximization of V, with P, and P given. Thus,
B represents the equivalent cash grant.x As far as the
program is voluntarily participated, B is always positive.
It means the tenant household finds that it will be better
off to accept GLCH. In order to estimate the distribution
of B we must specify the equation (4.3) in an estimable
form. Since not every form of utility function implies
estimable form of B, the Cobb-Douglas utility function is
applied to specify the individual household preference.
(4.4)
Its budget constraint under subsidized rent in
housing is specified as,
(4.5)
where variables are defined as before and b is
the household's rent-income ratio.
x See Murray, op. cit., p. 773.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function implies unitary
price and income elasticities for housing and non-housing
goods. It is only important to consider the restrictions
on housing demand and expenditure, since all ncn-housinc
good. It is noted that, if it were true than one demand
for housing had unitary price and income elas-deities,
it would necessarily be true that the same conditions
12
hold for the non-housing goods. Throughout our analysis
we have no attempt to study the price elasticity of housing
demand. Admittedly, supported by the findings of Deleeuw
and Muth, we assume there is an unitary price elasticity
13
in housing demand
With respect to the income elasticitv, it has beenx.—
shown in the preceding chapter that an elasticity of unity
is not rejected. To consider the rent-income ratio it is
more adequate to interpret b in equation (4.4) as the
budget share of rental expenditure. Thus, the hypotheti¬
cal utility function is consistent with our empirical
evidence of Chapter III.
Optimizing equation (4.2), the first order condi¬
tions of Lagrangian (4.2) for utility maximization are:
1 2
See DeSalvo, op. cit., p. 180.
13
Muth, ''The Demand for Non-Farm Housing, p. ,2;





From (4.9). we obtain the relations:
. (4.10;
.(4.115
Equation (4.8) implies the condition of budget
constraint:
(4.12)
Neither equation (4.10) nor (4.11) is suitable for
estimation because the ratio of prices is not a good choice
as a dependent variable. The linearity of equation (4.10)
and (4.11) permits substitution from equation (4.12).
Considering the subsidized rent in GLCH, we replace P, ofAit
(4.10) by aP (i.e. is multiplied by a. It means ahe
price of housing service can be changed in GLCH through
subsidy. If the price is subsidized, then 0 a 41, and
if it is equal to the market rent, then a- 1). After the




Nov- suppose the household participates in the
GLCH program (i.e. a 1), and obtain units of housing
and units of other goods with an unchanged income of
Y. (as shown in Ficure 4.1). The utility level Un associ-
ated with these amounts is, of course
.(4.15)
To measure the tenant net benefit, 3 (the amount
of BC in Figure 4.1), we have to know first how much income
is necessary for the household to obtain when it is
required tc pay market rent. (It means a= 1 in equation
»
4.13). This can be found by substitutinc the demand re-« —
lations (4.13) and (4.14) into the utility function (4.4)
setting a= 1 and U=? and solve for Y, i.e., find the
income level that solves;
The solution of Y is:
f' .A''' 1«•~«. U. V J
As far as our earlier discussion is concerned,
and we use the notation R to denote the market rent of
m
H2 and R denotes the actual rent paid by the tenant,
rewrite (4.16) with subs~itutions
and
we cet the amount of tenant net benefit
(4•17:
j Eouaticn (4,17) is the measurable form of tenant
-i
f hpnpfi f in nub] ac housmc.
The remainder of this section is to consider the
statistical implications of the above discussions. It is
used to demonstrate the Cobb-Douglas specification affords
a clear solution of the simultaneity difficulty in
estimation.
Nov; let us consider the two equations (4.13) and
•
(4.14), each of which can be used to estimate the value b
independently. As far as the identification problem is
concerned, it is necessary to apply an estimation method
to either equation (4.13) or (4.14), in obtaining an
14
it is exactly the same formulation of DeSaivo.
See DeSaivo, A Methodology for Evaluating Housing
Program, p. 81.
Identical estimate of b. Revrite (4.13) and (414) with
the addition of stochastic terms u, and u respective!v.
(i.e. a=l)
( f y o
-• 7
Thus, the application of ordinary least square
to either equation (4.18) or (4.19) will yield the same
estimate of h, since the simultaneous system. (4.10) to
(4.12) Is exactly identified. Johnston has shown that
If Y is taken as exgeneous, these estimates of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function parameters will be consistent
and unbiased.-' Estimation results of equation (3.22) in
section 3.6 are the estimates of (4.18) by relating
rental shares in income (rent-income ratio) to family
size, age of household head, social status and sex of the
head of household. On the other hand, if u. in equation
(4.18) is random with the mean equal to zero and the
variance eoual to constant, as well as u, has no svstema-
tic relationship with the social-demographic characteri-
tics of the household, then b must be the sample mean of
rent-income ratio. VJe have mentioned several times chat
i 5
Johnston, op« cit., pp. 341-65.
household total expenditure is reqarded as the croxv iOr
true incore, and rent-income ratio is replaced with rent-
expenditure ratio. The sample mean value of the later
is 0.1777.
4.5 Data and Heteroscedasticity Consideration of The
Ilod el
The household expenditure survey of 1973-1974
includes 154 families who are living in GLCH units. The
recorded data contain the area of their dwellings, and
the actual rental payment of GLCH, as well as the informa¬
tion of household total expenditure and characteristics
of the household. With the assumption of the similarity
in preferences, equation (3.22) is used to predict the
rent-expenditure ratio, b, which a GLCH tenant household
would have if it had not participated in the program.
Because of the smallness of its coefficient of determina¬
tion, equation (3.22) is not a very good predictor, and
it shows that u, of (4.15) is likely to be uncorrelated
n
with household characteristics. In addition to utilizing
equation (3.22), we apply the sample mean value of 0.1777
for prediction of the rent-expenditure ratio in the
following analysis.
The estimation of market rent of GLCH unit is
based on the estimate of per square foot rent of GLCH.
As GLCH is similar to post-war tenement floor but with
less service and finishina works which contribute one-
16
fourth of the rental cost. In 1973 the estimated fair
market rent per square of the small tenement floor was
17
HKS1.64X and cur estimate of the market rent oer square
foot of C-LCH is therefore HKS1.23 (HKS1.64 x 0.75).
Using the space of the individual GLCH units, we can
calculate their estimated market rents easily.
As the market rent, Rm is measured in the wav
that we have lust stated, anc actual paid rent Rp is
recorded in the survey, there is no difficulty in obtain¬
ing the magnitude of subsidy, S. It is exactly equal to
the difference between market rent and actual paid rent.
To estimate the distribution of tenant net
benefit in GLCH by equation (4.17) requires the estimates
of the following variables: (1) the market rent of the
GLCH, Rm (2) the actual paid rent of the tenant household,
Rp (3) the rent-exDenditure ratio, b of the household as
if it were facing market price, and (4) the budget of the
tenant household (total expenditure), Y.Rp and Y are
16
The information is supplied by Architectural
Office, Public Works Department of Hong ?Cong during the
author's personal interview.
17
Commissioner of Rating and Valuation Department,
pp.cit.p. 64.
Vobservable and recorded, R and b are not observable
directlv and estimated as what we have stated.
To take into account of the heterosceaasticity
of the disturbance term is the task of the remaining dis¬
cussion of this section. We have mentioned that there is
no income iirr.it at which a GLCH tenant household must
give up its tenancy. This policy allows great diversities
in tenant households incomes and expenditures. The
assumotion of a constant variance for the disturbance term
is unrealistic, since our econometric study is based on
cross—section data. It is generally believed that the
residual variance about the regression function increases
with household expenditure. This prior knowledge leads us
to expect that the residual variance of housing services
in GLCH about the regression equation increases as house¬
hold expenditure increases. Along the same line of reason¬
ing, the disturbance terms in the regression equations of
housing subsidies and tenant net benefits are expected to
be heterosecdastic in character. Ordinary least square
estimation of regression equation with heteroscedasticity
in disturbance terms do not yield the best linear estimates
8
because of the lack of a constant error term. The bias
18
See Rao and Miller, 0£. cit., p. 77.
depends on the nature and the degree of heteroscedasticity
and the method of ordinary least square does not have
maximum efficiency. It is also noted that he teroseehas ti-
city also affects hypothesis testing for it seriously
go
affects the significant level and the power of the tests.
Along the reasoning of the preceding chapter,
certain independent variables enter into the regression
equation. Now let us estimate the distribution of housinaJl.—
services with respect to the household expenditure level
and household characteristics. A regression model is
formed as,
a 9 no h o A J
where R. is the estimated market rent of the
mi
GLCH unit where the i-th household is living in,.C,-
denotes household expenditure and denotes household
size; and A2 are dummy variables, with A= 1 when the
age of the head of household is in the range between 35 to
55, and A= 1 as his age is greater than 55. St is the
dummy variable that denotes the social status of household
head with its value equal to 1 if he is an employer,
otherwise St= 0. The dummy variable Sex is set to be 1
19
See Manlinvaud, op. cit., pp. 255-57.
for a female head, and 0 for a male head of household.
If the disturbance term is homosedas tic, which implies,
.(4.21)
2
where 1 (u.) denotes the variance cf the dietur-
f
bance term, and ck is an unknown constant. Equation
(4.21) means that the variance of disturbance term is a
2 0
constant and under certain additional conditions
ordinary least square estimation gives the best unbiased
estimates. If the disturbance term is heteroscedastic,
then equation (4.21) needs a transformation. However,
we do not knew the individual variances of the disturban¬
ce term, cur transformation is based on the assumption
that variance of the distrubance term is proportional to
i
the square cf household expenditure C., that is
( d_ 2 P)
,n; observations
2
where u (u.) denotes the variance cf disturbance
2
term, cr- denotes the unknown constant. Herein, we state
without proof that if (4.22) holds, the application of
9
ordinary least squares to the following transformed
21
equation (4.23) will give us the best unbiased estimates
for the distribution of housina services
20
For the additional conditions see Johnston, cp.
cit., pp. 121—23.
2 1
For the proof can be found in Johanston, op. cit.,
pp. 214-16, or Rao and Miller, op. cit., on. 77-80.
(4.23)
These transformations are made to correct sub¬
stantial' heteroscedasticity. The intercept in the repres¬
sion (4.23) cn d and the constant term d„ is legi-irately
interpreted as the coefficient of Ch.
This line of reasoning is extended to provide the
transformations of regression equations of tenant house¬
hold's paid rent, housing subsidies and tenant net
benefits. or the distribution of paid rent, we have:
, (4.24)
where R v denotes tenant paid rent, and all ncta-
' P
tions denote those as stated in equation (4.23). Since
V
the housing subsidies are equal to the difference between
market rents and paid rents, then equation (4.25) is
formulated to estimate the distribution of the housinc
subsidies.
c, v -T O 4.;
wher; 4- h= amniinf n~ =l 3 n=; 1 d J
received by the i-th household, and all notations ar
defined in cue same way as in equation (4.23). The
regression equation to estimate the distribution of
tenant net benefits is formulated as,
where tenant net benefit, 3. is measured in' i
accordance with equation (4.17) and all notations are
defined as previously stated.
4.6 Discussions on The Findings of The Regression_| i ii i i i i-•
Equations
This section presents the results of the regression
equations from (4c23) to (4.26) in tabular form,
Estimatinc equation (4.26), there are two alternatives to
measure tenant net benefits though equation (4.17) is
always used. One is to predict the rent-expenditure ratio
of the tenant household if it had not Darticinated in GLCHA. A.
by the sample mean of the ratio of the private rental
sector, which is equal to 0.1777. The other is to estimate
the rent-expenditure ratio by adopting the estimated
coefficients of regression equation (3.22)„ This approach
involves a two-stages estimation procedure. Nevertheless,
the results of two alternatives are both presented and
discussed in this section. we estimate equations (4.23)
to (4.26) in sequence by least square method, and analyse
the results as fellows:
4.6.1 Distribution of Housing Services
Table (4.2) presents the results of regression
equation (4.23). The insignificance of the social-
demographic dummy variables, (e.g. age, social status and
sex of household head) confirms the fact that government
policy in allocating GLCH is independent of considerations
for such social—democraohic factors. The authority has
not considered to deliver more housing services to the
younger families or older families. There is no discri¬
mination in GLCH housing services distribution with respect
to social status and. sex of the household head Recalling
that, in equation (4.23) the coefficient of the expendi¬
ture reciprocal should be interpreted as the constant term
and the intercept of the estimation must be legitimately
interpreted as the coefficient of expenditure. In order
to facilitate an easier interpretation, we present the
pre—transformed results of Table (4.2) by Table (4.3).
Table 4.2
Transformated Equation of Housing Service as A Function
of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics




































Multiple correlation coefficient R= 0.82610
Coefficient of determination _ n £8244
Standard error S= 0.0604s
F statistic F= 52.65004
Number of observations n= 154
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses below their respective
regression coefficients.
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 57
level of the F test.
Table 4.3
Reversed—Results of Housina Services as A Function
of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics
Component of Monthly Housing
Services in GCCH HHS per month
Basic housing service delivered
to every GLCH tenant 172.47
A.dd, per HKS100 of household
monthly expenditure:
-i- A. 1.525
per household member: 16.21
Table (4.3) gives us a simple but clear picture.
It shows that once a family is qualified for GLCH there
is HKS172.47 amount of housing service distributed to
i
this family regardless of other considerations. Generally
speaking, an additional household member will lead the
family to receive HKS16.21 more housing service per
month. This is because a larger flat is assigned to a
•«
larger household. The small amount of HK$1.525 for
additional HKllCO household expenditure points out that
the assignment of housing service in GLCH has only
limited consideration of tenant household's income once
the family is elioible.
Since the original results of transformed ecua-
2 2
tion (4.24) gives us no more insight, we just discuss
the findings which are reversed in the same way as Table
(4 o 2) tc Table (4.3).
In Table (4.4), it shows that the basic renta1
charged in GLCH is HK$67.85 per month. If cur findings
in Table (4.3) is not subject to serious error, then by
the concent of S= R- R, (nousixng subsidy= market
rn p5
rent- paid rent), we can estimate that there is
HK$104.62 per month basic nominal benefit distributed tc
every GLCH tenant household. This amount is obtained by
comparing the values of the first rows of Table (i.3) and
Table (4.4). Kith the comparison of other respective
values in Table (4.3) and (4.4), it-is also noted that
the nominal benefit (housing subsidy) increases with
2 2
The original result of equation (4.24) is:
Note: The standard errors are shown beIow their
respective regression coefficients:
significant at 1% of F test.
Table 4.4
Reversed—Results of Rent Paid as A Function of Household
Expenditure and Household Characteristics
Component of Konthly Rent
Paid for GLCH HKS per month
Basic rent paid by the tenant
for every GLCH unit 67.65
Add, per HKSICC of household
monthlv expenditure 0.573
per household member
family size. Relating the distribution of housing ser¬
vices and rent paid for such services to household ex¬
penditure level, inspite of the smallness in amount




Another major discovery from Table (4.4) is con-
nected with the principle of ability to pay. As we have
estimated that the rent—expenditure ratio in market rent
under household's free choice is 0.1777, it implies that
an additional $17.77 would be spent on housina per $100
increase in household expenditure, if the tenant household
23
Higher household expenditure is thought to be
associated with higher family income.
Table 4.6
Transformed Equation of Housing Subsidies (Nominal Benefit)
as a Function of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics






































Multiple correlation coefficient R= 0.79110
Coefficient of determination R= O.62585
Standard error S= 0.05161
F statistic F= 40.98111
Number of observations n= 154
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses below their respective
regression coefficients
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the 5
level of the F test.
had not be admitted into GLCHo Since the rent paid for
GLCH is not found to be related to tenant household's
expenditure level (i.e, $0,573 increase in rent with $100
increase in household's expenditure), it has clearly
pointed out that the government rental policy in GLCH has
not applied the principle of ability to pay.
4.6.2 Distribution of Subsidies (Nominal benefits)
Table (4.5) and Table (4.6) present the estimation
results of equation (4.25). The direct estimation of the
distribution of housing subsidies (nominal benefits)
reinforce the arguments that we have just stated above.
i
Based on Table (4.5) we conclude there is no significant
difference in receiving housing subsidies with regard to
the age and social status of the household head.
On the basis of Table (4.6), we observe that a
GLCH tenant household receives a basic housing subsidy
amount of HKS104.63 per month. Those with more members
receive greater amount of subsidies, and these headed by
females receive lower subsidies. Though we are less
confident in saying that those households with higher
expenditure levels receive more subsidies, there is also
no indication for higher expenditure families receive less
2
Tnis rough estimation is valid since expenditure
elasticity equals to 1.
Table 4® 6
Reversed-Results of Housing Subsidies
(Nominal Benefits) as A Function of Household Expenditure
and Household Characteristics
Component of Monthly Housing
Subsidies in GLCH KKS per month
Basic subsidies received by
every GLCH tenant 'OA a
Add, per HK$100 of household
monthly expenditure C- 9C-
per household member -iota
for female household head -57.62
subsidies® If there is a positive relationship between
permanent income and total expenditure, our results point
out that in GLCH the government has not given more
subsidies to the relatively poor®
To explain the positive relationships between
family size and 'housing subsidies is quite easy. It is
known that a certain amount of subsidy is tied to every
square foot of space in GLCH, (market rent per square
foot is greater than actual paid rent per square foot),
and a larger flat is always assigned to a larger household.
Since the allocation policy in GLCH has no discrimination
against female heads of households, it is unfortunate
that we can not provide a plausible reason to interpret
the negative coefficient of the sex variable. Ive are
expecting an insignificant estimate, for Table (4.2)
tells us that no difference in distribution of housing
service regarding to sex of household head, and there is
no differentiation in rent charged for female head.
4.6.3 Distribution of Tenant Net Benefits
Nov; we turn to the key analysis of this chapter.
The major interest for the whole discussion of this
chapter is tc- study the distribution of tenant net benefits
which are different from housing subsidies. As economic
efficiency and equity are concerned, we want tc know the
amount of difference between subsidies and benefits. If
this amount is very large it might justify for some other
form of transfer to our target population. Here, we can
not prov,ide a direct answer to this question. Instead,
we estimate the additional cost of transfers in-housing
rather than in-cash. This amount is the cost that tax¬
payers pay for their benefits generated from the housing
consumption externalities of GLCH tenant households.
Table (4.7) and Table (4.8) present the least
square estimates of the coefficients of the regression
equation (4.26). As we have stated, there are two ways
to estimate the tenant net benefits, Table (4.7) presents
the results of estimating rent-expenditure ratio by
equation (3,22) and Table (4.8) presents results based on
«
the sample mean of rent-expenditure, which 0.1777.
Comparing the regression statistics of Table (4.7)
and Table (4.8), no significant difference is discovered.
It tells us nothing about which of these is more
%
'appropriate1 to explain the distribution of tenant net
benefits. The judgement should lie on theoretical ground
rather than statistic inferences. Adopting the sample mean
value of rent-expenditure ratio means we accept the
hypothesis that the rental share in household expenditure
budget has a normal distribution with a constant mean and
a constant variance. There is no systematic relationship
between rent-expenditure ratio and household characteri-
25
sties including household expenditure. On the other
hand, the estimation of benefits in which the rent-
expenditure is estimated by the coefficients of equation
(3.22) implies the acceptance of the assumption that there
is systematic variations between rent-expenditure ratio
and household characteristics, excluding household
25
It implies the expenditure elasticity of rental
expenditure equals to one and elasticity of household
size equals to zero. Cf. the results of Table 3.4.
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denotes those coefficients vhich are significant at the 5
level of the F test.
Table +.8
Transformed Equation of Tenant Net Benefits as a Function
of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics
With Rent-Expenditure Ratio= 0.1777
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Regression Parameters:
regression constant 0.0619























Multiple correlation coefficient R= 0.69413
Coefficient of determination p2= n.UR18?
Standard error S= 0.0426+
F statistic F= 2?.78078
Number of observations n= 154
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses below their respective
regression coefficients.
denotes those coefficients which are significant at the
level of F test.
denotes the coefficient which is significant at the 1% level
of the F test.
expenditure. As far as the household expenditure is not
included as ere of the independent variables in equation
(3.22), it is consistent with the assumption of unitary
expenditure elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas utility func¬
tion.. Throughout our discussions of Chapter III we feel
less confides.c to reject any of these two alternatives,
since both accroaches are consistent with our basic
assumption. In addition to the difficulty on theoretical
ground, the difference in the level of significance
critically influence our interpretations. In Table (4.7
all coefficients are not significantly different from
zero, excepc the expenditure reciprocal. It is the same
thing in Table (4.8) if we adopt 1% as the level of
significance. But if we set the level of significance a'
5% as usual, then in Table (4.8) the coefficients of
household size and sex of household head become signifi¬
cant as well as the coefficient of the expenditure
reciprocal. without making more confusion and keeping
the above discussion in mind we reverse the results of
Table (4.7) and Table (4.8) separately.
Table (4.9) has shown two major findings. It
tells us that cc every GLCH tenant, the additional costs
of transfer in—housing, which is the difference between
subsidy and benefit, equals to HKS27.81 per month
Table 4,9
Reversed—Results of Tenant Net Benefits as A Function
of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics
(Based on equation 3.22)
Component of Monthly Tenant
Net Benefits in GLCH H KS per menuh
Basic net benefit received by
every GLCH tenant
-A 74.
Add, per HKS100 of household
monthly expenditure 7 3• ——
(HK$104o63- KKS74.81). As the net benefit increases with
household expenditure, the additional cost of in-kind
transfer decreases with household expenditure increases.,
What is more important is our estimates show that these
households with higher expenditures (higher incomes)
receive greater benefits.
In Table (4.10), we find that the basic net benefit
received by every GLCH tenant is lower than the estimates
in Table (4.9). It also implies a greater amount of
additional cost is imposed by transfer in-housing in this
estimation. The additional cost equals to HKS47.37 per
month (HKS1C4.63- HKS57.26). It decreases with household
size increases. Not much different from Table (4.9),
Table (4.10) shows that those households with higher
Tpihi 4 .1 r
Reversed-Results of Tenant Net Benefits as A Functior
of Household Expenditure and Household Characteristics
(Based on sample mean of rent-expenditure)
Component of Monthly Tenant
lT T- p.hn r- CT TU f T.— 1 T__J -r-s- v rrs v-— v-
Basic net benefit received b;s
everv T-LCH tenant 57.26
Add, per HKS100 of household
monthly expenditure
per household member «-? 'N O~
for female household head -IP. KV'
Note:, net significant, at 1% level of significance of
the F te s t.
expenditures receive more benefits. It is surprising
that with a female head a household receives substantial¬
ly less benefit than one headed by a male. Though this
result is consistent with Table (4.6), in which it has
shown that a household headed by a female receives less
housing subsidy as well as less benefit, a plausible
explanation of this phenonmena is not easy to find.
DeSalvo has discovered that in Mitchell-Lama Hcusing
Program of New Fork City, households headed by females
also receive lower benefits. Unfortunately, he has not
provided any reason for this result. But we have noted
that the coefficients of household size and sex variables
become insignificant if we choose 1% as the level of
significance.
No ratter what is the difference between Table
(4.9) and Table (4.10), they present the same fact that
both tenant net benefit and subsidy increase with house¬
hold expenditure.
4.7 Implications of Kajor Findings
To avoid the repetition of all results in section
4.5, here we just give a brief summary. First, our esti¬
mates verify the theoretical prediction that housing
subsidy must be greater than tenant net benefit. In other
words, there is always an additional cost of transfer
in-kind over transfer in-cash. Second, it reveals that
in GLCH program, the rental policy is not in accordance
with the principle of ability to pay. Third, with
reference to Table (4.3), it shows that there is very
little increase in housing service with a increase in
tenant's income. It means that consumption of housing
services of GLCH tenants are maladjusted because of the
2 6
DeSalvo, Benefits and Costs of Housing Program,
p. 804.
rigidity of public housing production and allocation
policies. Fourth, despite of the difference between
Table (4,9) and Table (4,10), they both show that tenant
net benefit and housing subsidy increase with household
income. To evaluate distributions of housing services
and subsidies, we state without proof the normative
theorem derived by Oslen, He writes,
If the cuantitv of the transfer activitv
(housing service) demanded by the recipient
varies directly with his permanent income,
if the quantity of the transfer activity
demanded bv the civer varies inversely with
the price of the transfer activity to him,
and if the civer places no value or. an
additional unit of the transfer activity
bevend some quantity; then the optimal
quantity of the transfer activity increases
with increases in the recipient's income,
but the size of the optimal subsidy from the
giver to the recipient varies inversely with
the recipient's permanent income only after
the recipient's income has exceeded a certain
amount.28
One implication from Oslen's Theorem is that
laraer amount of housina services must be delivered to
those families with higher incomes. But, if there are
households with incomes greater than a certain }evel at
It is always accepted that the housencld expendi¬
ture varies positively with its income.
See Oslen, A Welfare Economic of Public Housing,
p. 56. The proof of this theorem can be found in his
dissertation. Parentheses and underline are added bv
author of this thesis.
which tax-payers would place no value on additional trans¬
fer, this theorem also implies that the government should
reduce their subsidies,, This suggests that there should
be more differentiated, housing units and differential
rents in public housing in accordance with tenant
families' incomes•
408 Limitation of Our Study
VJhat we consider as limitations in this chapter
are those assumptions based on prior information without
evidence provided by this text independently. It is
believed that understanding the limitations will signify
future studies with more contributions. Firstly, the
most serious handicap is the possible error in estimating
the market rent of GLCH. It may produce significant
errors in all regression estimates of this chapter. If
detailed information on the market rents of public housing
are available, the accuracy of our estimation will be much
improved. Secondly, the adoption of the Cobb-Douglas
utility function implies both income elasticity and price
elasticity are equal to one. In so far as we have no
empirical evidence to support an unitary price elasticity,
a more generalized CIS utility function is mere appropri¬
ate. But unfortunately the analysis of tenant net
benefits from the CES utility function requires observation
of price and quantity indices, which are nor obtainable
to us. Finally there is no prior information to support
the assumption chat the variance of disturbance term is
proportional no the souare of household expenditure.1. X -i-~
DeSalvo has applied this assumption in transforming his
regression equations in his study on rent control in
O r
New York City' and obtained satisfactory results.
However researchers may note that such correction of
heteroscedasticity does not necessarily produce best
answers•
2 Q
Joseph S. DeSalvo, Reforming Rent Control in
New York City: Analysis of Housing Expenditures and
Market Rentals, Papers, The 'Regional Science Rssocia-
tion, XXVII (1971), do. 195-227.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis covers a wide range of copies• As
many detailed results and estimates derived in its course
have been reported in previous chapters, chis chapter is
limited to a list of the more important findincs which
are presented in a descriptive manner. While our inquiry
has a largely policy orientation, its central result
would be connected with policy recommendations. In this
chapter, an attempt is made to indicate the lines along
which future policies should be directed. Since there
are various kinds of limitation in our quantitative
measure some suggestions for future research are also
provided.
5,1 The Findings
First, in Hong Kong our housing problem is largely
connected with land scarcity, and it is all known that
externalities in housing consumption is a component of
overall exrernalities in land use. For this reason the
discussion on housing policies is related with land use
policy. -According to John S. Mill public ownership of
land may be justified as an Instrument for society to
reserve the right to benefit from this natural gift®
However, it is not necessary to base this justification
on normative judgement There are always arguments for
public ownership of land on positive ground Concerning
production and consumption externalities of land usage,
public ownership may be more efficient With special
consideration on housing consumption externalities, seme
amount of transfer in-housing can be justified, as the
local optimum.
Second, though it is an intent of rent control
to keep roofs over the heads of resident tenants, it is
not the final solution of the housing problem based on
theoretical and empirical ground. For as Hayek says,
if the aim is to keep rents permanently depressed, then
for as long as rents are held below market rates it will
be necessary to use public money to provide the total
supply. But unfortunately, not much different from
public housing programs abroad, serious deficiencies
emerge in cur government subsidized housing programs
Third, in private rental sector, it is found the
consumption of housing service is somehow functionally
related to household total expenditure in fixed
proportion. If the expenditure elasticity in housing
1
Hayek, The Repercussions of Rent Restrictions, p. 5
demand is a good approximation to income elasticity,
then both are not significant different from one• And,
by the estimation of the behavioural ecuation, it is also
found that there is ''economy of scale in housing space
Fourth, Adopting the approach of Hick sian price
equivalent variation with the application of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function, our estimates of GLCH verify what
has been predicted by theory that the costs of transfer
in-kind are necessarv creater than the tenant net benefits.
Every GI.CH tenant household receives HKSIC'5 housinc subsidy
per month, an equiivalent cash grant of around HKS57 to
HKS75. Transfer in-kind by means of GLCH therefore imposes
an additional cost of KK$3 0 to HKS48 over transfer in-
cash or sociptv.
'h-;
Fifth, with respect to the distribution of housing
services and tenant net benefits, it leads us to conclude
that once a family is qualified for GLCH there is a
certain amount of basic housing service, subsidy and tenant
net benefit transferred to it regardless of chances of its
incomes in the course of time. These amounts of distribu¬
ted housing service and subsidy increase with household
size Furthermore, we find there is no discrimination in
distribution of such quantities with respect to the ace or
social status cf the head of the tenant household.
5,2 Some Pclicv implications
Though public ownership of land may be accepted,
it does not imply that the prevailing land policy has
achieved an optimal allocation of resources. In Hong Kong
a larce amount of land is accuired by reclamation, the
production cf land should reach an output level at which
the additional cost cf land acquirement (marginal social
cost) equal to the additional land sales revenue (marginal
social benefit). This principle should be adopted by the
government in future land development.
As transfer in-housing is theoretically justified
by externalities, it is still not necessary to give the
recipient a particular physical unit. According to the
second law of supply, it is incorrect to insist that hous¬
ing supply is inelastic in the long-run. It is doubtful
to remark that only the government can increase the supply
of housing for low-income families. No matter how we
separate the housing market into different sub-markets,
The reascnality of Figure 1.1 is basec on such an
unrealistic assumption. In the arguments of Henry Smith,
he implicitly accept this assumption. See Henry Smith,
John Stuart Kill's Other Island- A study cf the economic
development of Hono Kong, IEA Research Monographs No. 6
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966) p. 22.
the substitution between sub-markets and filtering in
housing can increase in the course of timeo Because of the
inflexibility of production subsidies, it is recommenced
that the Government should pay more attention on thes Jl
feasibility of consumer housing subsidies such as housing
allowance.
Considerinc the intermediate hcusinc subsidies
policies, since the government maintains its interest in
production of housing, the prevailing allocation policy
does not achieve an optimal distribution of hcusinc servi-a.
ces and housing subsidies. It is not necessary to allocate
the sheltering space with a fixed area per capita while
there is economy of scale in space demand of housing.
The larger families may need smaller space per capita.
According to Oslen's Theorem, mere housing services
should be allocated to higher income households. It Is
then advisible to produce different outputs services In
i
the public housing programs. In other words, we are look¬
ing forward to more differentiation in public housing units
in the near future. The government may be unwilling to
transfer more subsidies to those tenant households with
higher incomes, differentiation in dwellings and rents can
achieve these objectives simultaneously. If there are
some public housing tenant households whose incomes have
reached a certain amount beyond which society would place
no value on additional transfer, then the government should
reduce such subsidies with increases in their income. For
this reason, the richer tenant households must be charged
higher rents.
It v:as even be suggested to set an upper income
limit at which residents have to leave public housing.
If Hong Kong citizens believe that public- housing should
be provided to the poor, then it is reasonable that those
most in need (e.g. the poor) should be firso served by
government social policy.
Most of housing economists agree -that the living
conditions of low-income families will improve with a
higher speed of filtering-down in housing. This principle
is applicable to both private and public sectors of housing.
The recently proposed scheme of Home Ownership can con¬
tribute to this aim. For it encourages richer tenant
households to leave their units and purchase homes with
some government subsidies. But the costs involved and the
actual consequences are still unforeseeable. In addition
to Home Ownership Scheme, differentiated rents and
compulsory service to quit will discourage higher income
tenant households to retain their units, and it will
accelerate the speed of filtering-down in public housing.
Along the seme line of reasoning, another alternative is
to increase rents of public housing gradually accompanied
by rent rebatements to those individual households in
need. These are half-way suggestions from changing pro¬
duction subsidies to consumer housing subsidies.
5.3 Suggestions for future Research
First, the crucial factor that determinates the
prospect of consumer housing subsidies is the elasticity
of housing supply. If it is completely inelastic then a
large amount of public spending in direct housing allowan¬
ces will co into the rockets of landlords thrcuch increa-
ses in rents. So far there is little knowledge about the
dynamic adjustment process and the market structure of
residential housing in Hong Kong. Research in this area
will be most useful.
Second, with respect to the measurement of the
permanent income effects on housing demand, reinterview
data are n'eeded for the instrumental variable method.
Future research should be conducted with reinterview survey
whenever it is possible.
Third, as we have mentioned at the end cf Chapter
III, our cross-section estimates are not representing the
coefficients of the best fitting line1' for the whole
population. For forecasting at the aggregate level,
estimates based on time series study are needed
Fourth, the methodology of this text can be
extended to apply to studies on other government subsidi¬
zed housing programs• With respect to the distributions
of housing services and housing subsidies we only need
the estimates of market rents of such housing units.
There is no need no formulate a precise utility function
unless we want to measure the amount of tenant net
benefits.
Fifth, with the same theoretical framework of this
text, one can estimate tenant net benefits with the CES
utility function by iterative procedure, provided that
quantity and price indices are available.
R i hi iocrri nh'
Books and articles
Alichian, Arm en• Information Costs, Pricing anc
Rescarce Unem.p 1 oyment, 1' Western Eccncmic Journal
VII (June. 1966 dd. 109-110.
Arceius, Franciso and Kelzter, Allan H. The
Markets for Housing and Housing Service, Journal
of Monev. Credit and Bankina V (1973). dd. 76-99.
Arron, Henry J. and von Furstenberg, George K.
The Inefficiency of Transfer in-Hind: The Case o:
-L.
Housing Assistance, Western Economic Journal, IX
(June. 1971). on. 184-98.
Berridge, J. D. The Housing Market and Urban
Residential Structure: A Review Centre of Urban
Community Studies, Research Paper He. 51
(Univer sitv of Tor on to)
Bish, Robert L. Public Housing: The Magnitude and
Distribution of Direct Benefits and Effecus on
Housing Consumption, Journal of Regional Science
IX (1969), op 425-38.
Bowsher, Herman N. and Kalish, Lionel. Does Slower
Monetary Expansion Discriminate Against Housing?
Review of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(June. 1968). dd. 5-12.
Caliner, Geoffrey. Income Elasticity of Housing
Demand, The Review of Economics and Statistics LV
(Nov., 1973), pp. 528-32.
Cheung, Steven N. S. Roofs or Stars: The Intents
and Actual Effects of a Rent Ordinance, Eccncmic
Incuirv XIII (March. 1975). dd. 1-21.
CI ape, John K, Causes of Disinvestment in New7 York
City's Housing, Annual of Regional Science IX,
(Nov.. 1975). dp. 93-105.
Cul1incworth, Jo 3. Housing and Government
fTr-.n' ill pd TV-JI n 1 Q P
DeSalvc, Joseph S. A Methodology for Evaluating
Housing Programs,M Journal of Recicnal Science
VT -CC1 i.y-,
DeSaivo, Joseph S. Reforming Rent Control in Hew
York City: analysis gf Housing Expenditures and
Market Rentals, Papers, The Regional Science
Association XXVII (1971). nn. 19 5-227
DeSalvo, Joseph S, Benefits and Costs of Nev; York
Ci-y's Kidcle-Income Housing Program, Journal of
Economy LXXXIV (August, 1975), po. 7 91-805 0
Eraakis-Sm.ith, D. H. Housing Provision in Retro-
pelican Hone 'Kong (Hone Kong: Hong Kono University
P« rv ne s s. a a-)-
Drakakis—Smith, Do TH« Urban Renewal in an Asian
Connext: A Case in Hong Kong, Urban Studies XIII
(1976). pp. 295-305.
Duesenderv, J. S. Income, Savinc, and The theory
of Consumer Behaviour (Cambridge Mass: Harvard
TV- vcrci P r~ O c; c: 1 Q Z1 Q_
Dvyer, D. J. Problems of Urbanization: The Example
of Hong Kong, Institute of British Geographers,
special publication no. 1 Land Use and Resources:
Studies in .applied Geography( 1968), pp. 169-85.
Feber, Robert. Research on Household Behaviour,
in Surveys of Economic Theory.3 (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 114-54.
Fisher, lanet, Family Life Cycle Analysis on
Research on Consumer Behaviour, in The Life Cycle
and Consumer Behaviour ed. by L. H. Clark (Hew
York: 1955), pp. 28-35.
Fisher, It R. Explorations in Savings Behaviour,
Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Statis¬
tics XVIII (August, 1956), pp. 201-78.
Freund John E. Modern Elementary Statistics, 3rd
edition (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1976).
Frsicman, Milton and Stigler, George. Roofs and
Ceilings The Current Housing Problems, in
Popular Hssays on Current Problems Vc 1. 1 No. 2
(New York: Foundation for Economic Education Inc.,
-1 Q 4 6)j' 4 A
Freicman, Milton. The Welfare Effects of Taxes,
in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: Yniver
r-i r- -U.~ n v- r- r- 1 O1 U t-n' C- i
Freicman, Milton. The Theory of the Consumetlon
Function (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
IOC71_
Freicman, Milton. The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics.
Kantro, M The Problem of Chinese Kefucees in
Hone Konc (Hondon: 1955)„
Hayek, Friedrich A. Degree of Extlanaticn, in
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1557),
rv-— 21fw' 4- -L©
Hayek, Friedrich A. The Repercussions of Rent
Restrictions, originally published in Schriften
Vercius fUr Sozialpolitik, 182, (Munich, 193C).
It is translated and reprinted in Verdict on Reni
Control IEA Readings No. 7 (London: The Institute
of Economic Affairs, 1972), pp. 3-16.
Henderson, J« M. and Euandt, R. E. Kicroeconcmic
Theory: A Mathematical Approach 2nd edition (Mew
. Kr. O V- -N .r, U A 1 1 1Q71
Hoffmeyer, E. and Mordhorst K. Determinants of
Fluctuations in House-Building in Denmark, 1880-
1940, in The Economic Problems of Housinc ec.
by Adela Adam Nevitt (Britain: St Martin's Press,
1967). nn. 92-104-
Hopkins, Keith. Public and Private Housing in
Hone Konc, in The Citv as a Centre of Chance in—'' i i r- i--- ——L-- in•~.—..
Asia ed. by D. J. Dwyer (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1972), pp. 200-15.
Hopkins, Keith. Housing the Poor, in Hong Kong
The industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1975), pp. 271-235.
Hcuuhakker, H, S. An International Comparison
of Household Expenditure Patterns: Commemorating
The Centenarv of Engel's Lav;, Econometrca XXV
(Cr-. 9 5~~ on. 577-51-
Hcu thakker, He S. and 'Taylor, L. D. Consumer Demand
in the United States (Cambridge Mass: Harvard Uni-
m v- c 4 4- t P c c c 1 G 7 H 1
Hovenstine, E. J. The Changing Holes of Housing
Production Subsidies and Consumer Housinc Subsidies:
in European National Hnusing Policy, Land Economics
T,T. 975)- nn. 86—94-
Garfinbel, Irwin. Is In-kind Redistribution
Efficient? quarterly Journal of Economics LXXXVII
( V= n. 1 9 7 7 n.n- 770-70-
Grebler Leo. and Kaisel, Sheman J. Determinants of
Residential Construction, in Impacts of Monetary
T2.r 1 i rmr( Vo- o r• Pronf i 1 1 Q_
Grav, Harmish. The cQst of Council Housina TEAJ- 7--
Research Monographs No. 18 (London: The Institute
of Ernrinmi r Affairs. 1968)-
Gray, Harmish and Pennance, F. G. Choice in Housing
TEA Research Report (London: The Institute of
TT 4 l rr or• 1 O f C)
Guttentag, Jack M. The Short Cycle in Residential
Construction, 1946-59, American Economic Review
LI (June. 1961). do. 2 7 5-98.
Johnson, Harry G. The Effects of Income—Redis¬
tribution on Aggregate Consumption with Interdepen¬
dence of Consumers' Preferences, Economica XIX
(1952), d. 131.
Johnston, J. Econometric Method 2nd edition (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972).
Lee, Long H. The Stock Demand Elasticities of
Non-Farm Housing, The Review of Economics and
S ha c; hi rY7.VT f ph.. 1). nn. RP— RP.
Lee, Tong H. Housing and Permanent Income: Tests
Based on a Three Year Reinterview Survey, The
Review of economics and Statistics L (Nov., 1966),
U i- 0— O CkJ e- v., tv vJ o
Leeuw, Frank de. The Demand for Housing: A Review
of Dross—Section Evidence, The Review of Economic5
and Statistics LIU (Feb., 1971), pp. 1-1C.
Leeuw, Frank de. and Lkanem, Nkanta F. Time rags
in zhe Rental Housing Market, Urban Studies X
(1973), pp. 39-68.
Liviaton, N.ssan. Errors in Variables and Engel
Curve Analysis, Econometrica, XXIX (July, 1961),
C -s J U U O
Liviaton, Nissan. Test of the Permanent—Income
Hypothesis Based on a Reinterview Saving Survey,
in Measurement in Economics: in meiriory of Yehuda
Grunfeld, ed. by Carl F. Christ and ethers
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963),
pp. 29-59.Jl.
Lov;ry, Ira S. Filtering and Housing Standards:
A Conceptual Analysis, Land Economics XXXVI
(I960), p. 362.
Lowry, Ira S. Rental Housing in New York City Vol. 1
Confronting the Crisis (New York: Rank Corp., 1971).
«
Malinvaud, E. Statistical Methods of Econometrics
(London: North-Holland Publishing Co.. 1966).
Maunder, U. F. Hong Kong Urban Rents and Housing
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Dniversity Press, 1969).
Kill, John Straut. Principles of Political Economy
ed. by Donald Winch (England: Pecuin Book Inc.,
1 e 7 o)L' v-'«
Mok, Benjamin N. Population Chance and Housing
Needs, in Population and Development Planning ed.
by Warren C. Robinson (New York: The Population
Council, 1975), pp. 95-106.
Murray, Micheal P» The Distribution of Tenant
Benefits in Public Housing, Econometrics XLIII
(Julv. 1975). dd. 771-88.
Muth, Richard F. The Demand for Hon-Farm Housing,
in The Demand for Durable Goods ed. by Arnold C0
Harberger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Ci r~ on n rz
Muth, Richard F. The .Stock Demand Elasticities of
Non-Farm Housing: Comment, The Review of Economic;
pnri SFsFi YT.VTT f Mnv.. 1985). nn. 447—49-
Muth, Richard F. Slum and Poverty, in The
Economic Problem of Housing ed. by Nevitt, Dp. 12-
26.
V.uth Richard F. Urban Economic Problems (New York:
1975)_
Neecleman, L. The economics of Housing (London:
Stsrles Press. 1965).
Oslen, Edgar C. A Competitive Theory of The
Housing Market, American Economic Review LIX
( 9« 4- 1 Q 8 Q)_ 819-99.
Oslen, Edgar C. Subsidized Housing in a Competitiv
Market: Reply, American Economic Review LXI (March
1971). dd. 220-24.
Oslen, Edgar C. An Econometric Analysis of Reni
Control, Journal of Political Economy LXXX
(Sect.Oct., 1972), pp. 1080—100.
Rao, Polalri and Millor, Rogar LeRoy. Applied
Econometrics (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
Ratcliff, R. U. Urban Land Economics (New York:
M c G raw—Hill Press. 1949).
Page, Alfred N. and Seyfried, Warren R. ed.
Urban Analysis: Readincs in Housing and UrbanW————immm——————mm—— i i- 1
Development (Illinois: Scott Foresman Co., 1970).
Prais, So J. Non-Linear Estimates of the Engel
Curves, Review of Economics and Statistics XX
( 9.9-5 9) 9 7-1,94.
Prais, S, J0 and Houthakker, K. S. The Analysis
of Family Budgets 2nd edition (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1971).
Reid, Karoaret E. Effect of Income Concept Urcn» A.
Expenditure Curves of Farm Families, Nat. Bur.
Eccn. Research, Studies in Income and health XV
(Nev; York: 19 52), pp. 13 3-74.
Reid, Margaret E. Capital Formation in Residen¬
tial Real Estate, Journal of Political Economy
LXVI (April, 1958), do. 131-53.
Reid, Margaret S. Housing and Income (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962).
Roberts, Philip J. Valuation of development Land
in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University cf Hong Kong
Press, 19 75).
Robinson, can. Yhat Is Perfect Corrpetition:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics XLIX (Nov.,
1934), do. 104-2 0.A. A-
Samuelson, Paul A. Pure Theory of Public Expendi¬
ture and Taxation, in Public Economics ec. by
JL Karoo! is and H. Guilton (Nev York: 1969).
Smith, Wallace. F. Housing: The Social and Economic
Elements (Berkeley and Los Angels: University of
California Press. 1970).
Siegel S. Nonparametrie Statistics for The Behavi¬
oural Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956).
«
Smith, Henry. John Straut Mill's C-her Island- A
Study of the Economic Development of Hong Kong,
IEA Monographs No. 6 (London: Institute of Economic
Affairs,l966).
Smolenskey, Eugene. Public Housing or Income
Supplements The Economics of Housing for the
Poor, Journal of The American Institute of Planners
Svamy, P. Efficient Inference in a random Coefficient
Regression Model, Econometrica XXXVIII (1970), pp.
331-23.
Tohin, James. Relative Income, Absolute Income
and Saving, in Money, Trade and Economic Growth
in Honour of J. H, Williams ed. by D. K. Wright
and o thers (New York: MacMi11an. 19 51).
Vickey, V7. ''Resource distribution Patterns and
Classificaticn of Families, in Nat. Bur. Icon.
R e s e a rch Studies in Incomes and Wealth, X( Ne v
York: 1952).
Winger, Allan Re An Approach To Measure Potential
Upgrading Demand in the Housing Market, Review of
Economics and Statistics (August, 1963), d:. 239-44.
Winger, Allan R. Housing and Income, Western
Economic Journal VI (June, 1968), or 226-32.
Winger, Allan R. Some internal Determinants of
Upkeeping Spending by Urban Home-Owners, Land
M r r,r. or i r c 7T i T V f 1 G 7 m ZL 7 ZL—. 7 Q
Wolman, Harold L. Housinq and Housina Policy in the
U. S. and the U. K. (London: D. Co Health and Co.,
19751.
Official Publications: Honq Konq (Government Printer
Census and statistics Department, Hone Kcnc
Population and Housino Census, 1971 Main Report
( 1972)'
Census and Statistics Department, Rene Kong
Kcnunly Dicest of Statistics, July, 1973 (1973)«
Census and Statistics Department, Hone rtcnc
Census and Statistics Department, Honc Kong Social
Economic Trends 1964-1974 (1975).
Census and Statistics Department, The Household
Expenditure Survey 1973-74 and The Consumer Price
Census and Statistics Department, Dstlmates of
Gross Domestic Product. 1961-74 (1976).
Commissioner for Census. Bv—Census. 1966.
Commissioner of Rating and Valuatir.c Department,
4, Background to Tenure and Rent Restrictions in
Hon r K on c (1976).
Commissioner of Resettlement, Annual Departmental
Rprrrfc; fvprinn
Hone Konq Government, The Ordinance of Hong Konq-
MQp.p—
Hone Kono Government, Review of Policies for Scuattei
Control, Resettlement and Government Low-Cost
Rousinc. 1964 (1964).
Hong Hong Government, Report of The Working Party
of Slum Clearance- 1965 (1965).
Hone Konc Government, Annual Reports (various years).
Hone Kong Legislative Council, Hone Kcnc Hansard-
1921 (1921).
Housing Authority, Annual Departmental Reports
(various years).
Housinc Beard, -deport of The Housing Board, 1972
(19 72).
Report of A Committee Appointed by the Governor
in 7951, Rent Control (1952).
Unpublished Materials and Other Works
Census and Statistics Department, kgpert cn 1974
Private Housina Survey (Mimeoarached).
Committee on Rent and Family Income (Netherlands),
1970 Rent and Family Income, The Hacue: Inter-
national Federation of Housinc and Planning.
Oslen, Edgar Go A Welfare Iconcmic Evaluation
of Public Housing, unpublished Ph. Dp disserca¬
tion (Rice University, 1S6S)-
The Times, 23 August, 19 74.


